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GRANDPARENTS' VISITATION RIGHTS: A SURVEY
OF RECIPROCAL KINSHIP-TIES BASED IN
HISTORICAL COMMON LAW AND LEGISLATIVE
POLICIES
JANE E. ATKINSON'
Blood is a destiny. One's genius descends in the stream from long
lines of ancestry.'
-A. Bronson Alcott, Tablets, 1868.
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the legal issues emerging in recent years
surrounding grandparents' petitioning the courts for access to
their grandchildren. Rather than viewing this legal issue from
the traditional standpoint of the autonomous family unit, this ar-
ticle adopts the perspective of the disenfranchised parties and
asserts the existence of an inviolable kinship tie to have access to
the progeny of one's children and they to their grandparents.2
. Jane E. Atkinson is a graduate of the University of Maine School of Law and
holds a B.A. in Social & Behavioral Science and an A.S. in Criminal Justice.
True to the reciprocal kinship values expressed in this article, I am cur-
rently caring for my mother, Rebecca, who was diagnosed with terminal
cancer during my first year of law school. Rebecca is my inspiration for
this article; seeing her pain at the loss of the relationship with her grand-
son provided me the focus to search for antecedent kinship ties, so that she
may ground this relationship more deeply than that afforded by enacted
law, but rather in tradition and the body of common law-the precursors to
law.
1. The author interprets this quotation to mean that the roots of our ancestral family heri-
tage began long ago and traversed through the many branches of our family tree, culminat-
ing in each of us-the legatees of these ancestral roots; all who went before us, remain
within us. Cf Christine Davik-Galbraith, Grandma, Grandpa, Where Are You?-Putting the
Focus of Grandparent Visitation Statutes on the Best Interests of the Child, 3 ELDER L.J.
143 (Spring, 1995) (arguing that familial problems should not end the grandparent-
grandchild relationship; rather, it is the right of both parties to visit with one another).
2. David M. Rosen, What Is a Family? Nature, Culture, and the Law, in FAMILY IN
TRANSITION 55-56 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 10th ed. 1999) (writing
"In American kinship,... the world of relatives is constructed out of deeply felt assump-
tions about nature and culture" (citing DAVID SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN KINSHIP: A
39
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The methodology employed to illuminate the basic issues is to
create an analogy between a grandparent's visitation rights
situation and another situation for which rules do exist. It is
plausible that an applicable rule is already binding on the analy-
sis, even though it has yet to be explicitly recognized by the
court. This inquiry into coterminous codes of law begins in the
annals of historical common law, which illustrate these enduring
reciprocal kinship ties that have survived for centuries as an in-
formal moral imperative.' This reciprocal filial relationship was
later formalized4 within the common law of estates that secured
the rightful flow of compensation for this exchange of duties and
rights between kin during their lives.
Underlying the expressly stated law lies the unstated law. It
is the unstated law "which itself presupposes some background
conventions that allow us to decide what counts."' The ontology
of the stated and unstated law sheds light on the norms of socie-
tal values that we seek to define and protect. These are the deep-
seated values that are the driving force behind the written law. 6
In the case of reciprocal kinship rights and duties, it is the moral
imperative that kin are obligated to perform certain duties for
one another, and in this process of filial exchange, certain rights
are born. "Law considered as a 'complex phenomenon' is a mix-
ture of normative and factual elements .... Law is seen as a sys-
tem of rules, but these rules constitute social facts as well as psy-
chic experiences, related to values according to a favoured
version of axiology." 7  Within this scheme of civilization, the
evolution of reciprocal kinship ties preceded the written legal
CULTURAL ACCOUNT (1980). Within this system of symbols, the "order of nature" refers to
the persons deemed to be relatives because they share a common heredity or blood. This
system of symbols defines certain human characteristics as inherent)).
3. Id. at 56. This is termed the "order of culture" and refers to the "system of symbols
that stands for ... the customary beliefs, codes of conduct, and traditions created and [self-]
imposed by human beings to serve as guidelines for [our social interactions]."
4. Id. at 56, (citing SCHNEIDER). This is the formalizing process we know as the "order
of law" which denotes "other persons are relatives because they are bound together under
law or custom."
5. Jerzy Wroblewski, On the Unstated in Law: Implicit Pre-suppositions and Conven-
tions, in CONTROVERSIES ABOUT LAW'S ONTOLOGY 91 (Paul Amselek & Neil MacCor-
mick eds., Edinburgh 1991).
6. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 505 (1977). Justice Harlan sur-
mised, "[e]ven if conditions of modem society have brought about a decline in extended
family households, they have not erased the accumulated wisdom of civilization [that] sup-
ports a larger conception of the family." (emphasis added).
7. Wroblewski, supra note 5, at 92 (referred to sometimes as our collective conscious-
ness-cultural values that are so innate and implicit within the textual law that they require
no articulation).
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code.8
A new national consensus is in progress in the dominion of
grandparents' rights.9 Every state provides for grandparent visi-
tation in some form reflecting both the needs for such remedial
legislation and the collective responsiveness of representatives
(acting en masse) to codify the legitimate legal interests of both
grandparents and grandchildren. 0 This illustrates further that
the progression of "[c]ivilization is a movement and not a condi-
tion, a voyage and not a harbor."" These "evolving standards of
decency ... mark the progress of a maturing society."12
The strength of our historical kinship traditions are further
bolstered by legislative policies which reveal contradictions in
how courts have construed grandparents' visitation rights as
subordinate within the present legal equation. These facts are
manifest in who we are as a people, and these organizing prin-
ciples of early antiquity continue to impact modem society. The
categories of nature and culture remain the prime symbolic ve-
hicles through which issues of family and kinship are addressed.
"Judges will continue to bend and shape these categories,
[which] are not so easily abandoned."' 3 These will continue to
be the cultural tools used to craft legal decisions.14
THE DYNAMICS OF KINSHIP TODAY
The configuration of our kinship structure has been influenced
by the longevity of our elder population." "As four or even five
generations of many families are now alive at the same time, we
8. Rosen, supra note 2, at 56. The "order of law" is a "subdomain of the order of cul-
ture;" the informal customs preceded the "codes of conduct created by judges, courts and
legislatures" and as such, mirrors the legitimacy already attached to these relationships.
9. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 74 (2000) (plurality opinion). This national consen-
sus is evident by the passage of grandparent visitation statutes across the United States, the
behavior of juries, international opinions, and the judgment of organizations with expertise
in the field.
10. Id An unmarked footnote on page seventy-four lists the statutory provisions in all
fifty states. The Supreme Court found some states' visitation statutes to be broad, such as
section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington, which gives any person the right
to seek visitation of a fit parent's child when it serves the best interest of the child. There-
fore, some state statutes are invalidated.
11. ARNOLD TOYNBEE, CIVILIZATION ON TRIAL 55 (1948).
12. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
13. Rosen, supra note 2, at 62.
14. Id.
15. Matilda White Riley, The Family in an Aging Society: A Matrix of Latent Relation-
ship, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION 492 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 10 h
ed. 1999).
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can no longer concentrate primary attention on nuclear families
of young parents and their children who occasionally visit or
provide material assistance to grandparents or other relatives." 16
Looking up the generational ladder, increasing numbers of a
child's four grandparents survive, providing new opportunities
for the members of this enlarged kinship structure to activate
and form close family bonds.'" This decline in mortality means
that "[flor the first time in history, most adults will live long
enough to get to know most of their grandchildren, and most
children have the opportunity to know most of their grandpar-
ents." 8
Today's complex kinship structure forms a matrix of latent
relationships -so labeled because they each have the potential to
become close and significant during one's lifetime.19 Given the
intricacies of the current kin networks, perhaps we need to now
think of a family less as the members of one household with in-
cidental linkages to kin in other households and more as a con-
tinuing interplay among intertwined lives; perhaps we need to
be open to the benefit from the mutual support provided by
these relationships.20 "As [these] family relationships are pro-
longed, socialization is ... recognized as a reciprocal process
that potentially extends throughout the lives of [these mem-
bers]." 21
This is especially significant when the nuclear family breaks
up. When children maintain contact with grandparents follow-
ing a divorce or the death of a parent, the grandparents can
bridge the gap between other relatives of the estranged families
(e.g., aunts, uncles, cousins) and maintain the sense of kin con-
nectedness.22 These relationships require a reciprocal invest-
ment of contact to create (or re-create) relationships that will last
a lifetime. 23 The trend in the proliferation of nonparental visita-
16. Id. at 374.
17. Id. at 377.
18. ANDREW J. CHERLIN & FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR., THE NEW AMERICAN
GRANDPARENT: A PLACE IN THE FAMILY, A LIFE APART (1987), cited in Andrew J. Cherlin
& Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., The Modernization of Grandparenthood, in FAMILY IN
TRANSITION 385, 386 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., I1 ed. 1999).
19. Rosen, supra note 2, at 55. The more this "new family relationship [is] modeled on a
traditional relationship grounded in culture, the more likely it is that the law will legally rec-
ognize the new relationship."
20. Riley, supra note 15, at 374.
21. Id. at 379.
22. Id. at 381.
23. Id. at 500.
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tion statutes signals the "changing realities of the American fam-
ily."24 In Troxel v. Granville, the seminal case addressing this visi-
tation, the Supreme Court reiterated that "the interest of parents
in the care, custody, and control of their children is perhaps the
oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this
court." 25 The dissent in Troxel found this type of reasoning to
treat children as chattel.26 But the question of children's access
to grandparents should not be framed in the context of fathers'
rights, mothers' rights, or parents' rights; 27 it is about the right of
the child to emotional integrity and continuity in filial relation-
ships.28 Further recognition that certain rights cannot be bar-
gained, usurped, or curtailed is noted in state tort caselaw. The
inviolability of certain rights is evinced by the fact that even par-
ents lack the authority to waive a minor's future right to a cause
of action for injuries due to third-party negligence. 29 "It must be
remembered that grandchildren ... have the natural right to
know their grandparents and that they benefit greatly from that
relationship."30
STATE LEGISLATIVE RECOGNITION OF GRANDPARENT
VISITATION RIGHTS
There is much criticism surrounding grounding grandparents'
rights of access to their grandchildren within the adversarial
process of the family courts. In the current legal framework, a
judge must balance the parents' fundamental liberty interest un-
der the Due Process Clause31 against grandparents' visitation
rights, an inferior right created by the legislature that is enforce-
able at the discretion of the court. First, grandparents normally
do not readily tread in the area of family court litigation unless
they are having serious difficulty with one or more of the par-
ents and, as a result, are not seeing their grandchildren regu-
larly. The grandparents have most likely tried to reach some
kind of an informal agreement with the parents but were unsuc-
24. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 89.
27. The acrimony of marital dissolution can supersede and swallow the best interests of
the children, where the parents' choices are motivated by self-interest and reflect their own
adult relationship preferences.
28. See King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992).
29. See, e.g., Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 10 (Wash. 1992) (en banc).
30. See Brief for Petitioners at 43, Troxel (No. 99-138).
31. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
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cessful.2 Or perhaps there are problems in their grandchildren's
home environment that moves them to intervene on the chil-
dren's behalf.33 If the parents are unstable, either emotionally or
financially, visitation may be important not only for the security
of the grandchildren, but also for allowing the grandparent an
informal way of monitoring their grandchildren's situation to
see if more serious intervention needs to be taken.34
There are a variety of situations where it is appropriate and
beneficial for the children if the grandparents pursue court-
ordered visitation. For example, if the parents are engaged in a
bitter divorce and custody battle and the grandparents have al-
ways been close to their grandchildren, this visitation may help
give the children some continuity and stability. This may be
particularly true where the grandparents are the parents of the
non-custodial parent. The custodial parent may be unwilling to
permit the soon-to-be-former-in-laws to visit the grandchildren,
and the parents of the noncustodial parent may not want to in-
fringe on his or her limited time with the children. In this case,
the grandparents can seek separate court-ordered visitation.
Other instances where grandparents have sought visitation
through the court occur when the noncustodial parent does not,
or cannot, exercise visitation periods.35
Court-ordered visitation may be necessary where the rela-
tionship between the grandparents and their adult child is
strained, and as a result, they do not get to see their grandchil-
dren when they have visitation.36 In Stacy v. Ross, 7 the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court was confronted with a challenge to the
court-ordered grandparent visitation in an "intact" family.
32. TRAcI TRULY, GRANDPARENTS' RIGHTS 9 (3d ed., Sphinx Publn 2001).
33. The reasons grandparents sue for visitation are numerous. For example, the child
may be abused or neglected, or the grandparent may wish to relieve the parent of the burden
of childcare costs. Intangible reasons such as wanting a child to feel a sense of connected-
ness to a deceased parent through the surviving members of the family, may be less persua-
sive grounds for visitation than abuse or neglect but are none the less important to giving the
child a sense of stability.
34. TRULY, supra note 32, at 13.
35. Id. "If you are seeing your grandchild but there is frequent conflict over scheduling,
having the court set ground rules may remove a source of conflict. This will also assure that
you get at least some regular contact with your grandchild, and you avoid being at the mercy
of one or both parents regarding your time with your grandchildren. Certainly, you may
expect opposition from your own son or daughter as well as the other parent."
36. Id.
37. See generally Stacy v. Ross, 798 So. 2d 1275 (Miss. 2001); see also Jackson v. Tan-
green, 18 P.3d 100, 106 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000) (applying rational basis scrutiny to the Ari-
zona statute, which accords due judicial weight to the parent's decision regarding the visita-
tion and the extent of the visits sought by the grandparent).
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There the court distinguished Ross from the Washington statute
at issue in Troxel, based on the express intent of the state legisla-
ture to grant such visitation to grandparents. An additional fac-
tor in the Ross decision was the poor relationship between the
parties that was likely to persist and eliminate any chance for a
grandparent-grandchild relationship without court-ordered visi-
tation. Truly further emphasized court-ordered visitation where
the relationship between the grandparents and both parents is
bad:
[Clourt intervention may be [the] only hope of main-
taining a relationship with [their] grandchild[ren]. Al-
though the fact that [the grandparents] have a poor re-
lationship with the parents may be used by the parents
in an attempt to block the visitation [they] have re-
quested. [But] courts generally realize that the grand-
parent statutes were passed in the first place to ac-
commodate families with fractured relationships. 8
In Herndon v. Tuhey,39 the Missouri Supreme Court upheld
the grandparent visitation statute, which permitted a grandpar-
ent's petition upon an unreasonable denial of visitation for more
than ninety days, so long as this contact was deemed to be in the
best interest of the children. 40 This particular case involved con-
tentious lawsuits over money, property, and physical alterca-
tions between the parties.41 Fortunately, the court was un-
swayed by these exhibitions and concluded that the statute was
reasonable; it was minimally intrusive to the family, and "it was
narrowly tailored to adequately protect the interests of parents
and children." 42 Maine's Grandparents Visitation Act survived a
challenge when the Supreme Judicial Court held that the statute
was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.43 Wyoming weighed into the fray over court-
ordered grandparent visitation, holding that their statute was
38. TRULY, supra note 32, at 13.
39. 857 S.W.2d 203, 210 (Mo. 1993) (en banc).
40. See, e.g., Martin v. Coop, 693 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1997) (permitting either grandpar-
ent of a deceased parent to petition for visitation did not create undue interference in the pa-
rental relationship).
41. Herndon, 857 S.W.2d at 210.
42. Id. (basing its conclusion on a showing that visitation is in the best interest of the
child).
43. See generally Rideout v. Riendeau, 761 A.2d 291 (Me. 2000).
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constitutional." The Wyoming court stressed the benefits of the
bond between grandparents and grandchildren:
[G]randparents and grandchildren normally have a
special bond [that] cannot be denied. Each benefits
from contact with the other. The child can learn respect,
a sense of responsibility and love. The grandparent can
be invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain an in-
sight into our changing society, and can avoid the lone-
liness which is so often a part of an aging parent's life.
These considerations by the state do not go too far in
intruding into the fundamental rights of the parents.45
If one or both of the parents have died, the grandparents
may consider filing in order to continue a regular relationship
with their grandchild. This is especially true if it is the grand-
parents' child who is the deceased parent, as was the case in
Troxel. The surviving parent may not emphasize keeping up
family contact with the deceased parent's relatives. Depending
on the venue, the grandparents may have to meet certain
threshold requirements before they can assert legal standing to
petition for visitation. These statutory requirements may confer
standing only in cases involving divorce or separation, where
visitation has been denied for a significant period of time and
the petition is dependent upon a showing that the grandparents
have an established relationship with their grandchildren. The
latter recognition requirement can be especially troubling and
impossible to meet in cases involving an infant with no previ-
ously established relationship with his grandparents. Ulti-
mately, if the grandparents meet the threshold requirements for
a visitation petition, they will gain an opportunity to convince
the court that the visits are in their grandchild's best interest be-
cause they serve to strengthen the grandchild's sense of family.46
The Supreme Court did not address, in Troxel, "whether the
Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to
include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a
condition precedent to granting visitation" but left it to the states
44. Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1 144, 1145 (Wyo. 1995).
45.Id. at 1149.
46. TRULY, supra note 32, at 13.
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to adjudicate the visitation standards on a case-by-case basis.47
In the wake of the Troxel decision, many states now impose new
requirements on grandparents seeking access to their grandchil-
dren. In some cases, grandparents must prove the existence of a
psychological attachment on the part of the child to this relation-
ship and that denial of this contact would cause real and signifi-
cant emotional loss to the child.4 1 Clearly, provisions such as
this pose an insurmountable challenge to grandparents seeking
enforceable visitation rights in cases involving young grandchil-
dren and can effectively foreclose the development of such a
connection between the child and his grandparents.49 The nar-
rowing of these legal rights, in response to the perception that
parents' rights and family autonomy were threatened, will result
in fewer grandparents winning in court."
A COMMON HERITAGE OF RECIPROCAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES
BETWEEN KIN
As a civilization and former colony of England, we share com-
mon historical patterns of kinship that point to the existence of a
common law custom of uncodified kinship or filial rights. These
rights derive from this ancient body of laws that codified these
customs over the centuries, forming the common law foundation
for our modern-day law in America. The movement of the pro-
gressive societies has been uniform in one respect-with the
gradual dissolution of family dependency and the growth of in-
dividual obligation in its place. The individual has steadily sub-
stituted for the family, as the unit that civil laws take into ac-
count. In this transition, the kinship ties between filial members
has been replaced by forms of reciprocity in rights and duties
originating in the family. These customary bonds, long forsaken,
have had a renaissance in the recent state legislative trends "cre-
ating" grandparents' visitation statutes in response to the rise in
disenfranchised grandparents seeking access to their grandchil-
47. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73. This is an exact inversion of the Wisconsin court's rea-
soning; this analytical framework would provide a bright-line rule for administering these
cases.
48. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
49. Cf Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (delving into the issue of pornogra-
phy).
50. JEFF ATKINSON, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION GUIDE TO FAMILY LAW, Ch. 12, at
25 (1997), available at www.abanet.org/publiced/practical/books/family/home.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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dren.
Sir Henry Maine studied the evolution of early societal cus-
toms and rules that eventually gave rise to the more complex le-
gal system that orders civilization. Maine described our social
history as a movement from the dictates of filial status to one of
individualized contractual status with each citizen acting as his
own agent. More recently, however, social scientists have de-
tected a reverse tendency in the law, and, as evidenced in
Maine's Ancient Law, "legal ideas and institutions have a real
course of development as much as the genera and species of liv-
ing creatures."51 In the history of political ideas, kinship unity
preceded recognition of the significance of local contiguity;
much like "[c]orporations never die, accordingly primitive law
considers the entities with which it deals, i.e. the patriarchal or
family groups, are perpetual and inextinguishable." 52
The family, then, is a type of archaic society in all the modi-
fications in which it is capable of assuming; the person, theoreti-
cally amalgamated into a family by their common descent, is
practically held together by common obedience to their highest
living ascendant-the father, grandfather, or great-grandfather.
"The patriarchal authority of a chieftain was as necessary an in-
gredient in the notion of the family group as the [presumed] fact
of its having sprung from his loins . .. . ."5 Starting from this
historical point, from a condition of society in which all the rela-
tions of persons are summed up in the relations of family, we
seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in
which all these relations arise from the free agreement of indi-
viduals. "All of the forms of status taken notice of in the laws
[structuring family relations] were derived from, and to some
extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently
residing in the family."M
Within the family structure is a method of classification and
nomenclature to aid in the organization of these filial relation-
ships. "Every man is related to an extraordinary number of men
called his brothers, . . . to an extraordinary number called his un-
cles." 55 Therefore, it is not only convenient but also necessary for
51. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW, xiv (10h ed. 1906) [hereinafter
ANCIENT LAW].
52. Id. at 122.
53. Id. at 128.
54. Id. at 164-65.
55. SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, LECTURES ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF
INSTITUTIONS-A SEQUEL TO ANCIENT LAW, 70 (1878) [hereinafter LECTURES].
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us to define our kinship community. A clear understanding
how one member was associated with another by tie of blood es-
tablished the common responsibilities and rights between
them.56 "It simplifies the conceptions of kinship and of conjoint
responsibility, first in the patriarchal family and ultimately in
the Clan or Tribe."57 Familial responsibilities established and
embraced through moral obligations rather than through laws:
The existence of the filius familias unity appear
to point at certain duties of the primitive patriarchal
chieftain which balanced his rights ... with a liability
to provide for all members of the brotherhood out of
the common fund. In Roman times these obligations to
the kinship network were not yet conceived of as a le-
gal duty, 'for law had not yet penetrated into the pre-
cincts of the family;' this was rather a moral obligation,
a duty semiconsciously followed and enforced rather
by instinct and habit than by definite sanctions.58
Similarly, "[iun the mature Greek jurisprudence, .. . [there are]
many traces of stringent family obligation [that] remain, the di-
rect authority of the parent is limited, as in European codes, to
the . .. minority of the children . . . ."59
This rudimentary tribal society gradually evolved into terri-
torial confederations and governmental structures began to
emerge as modern law took shape. Roman law, with its empha-
sis on custom, heavily influenced the development of modem
law in much of Europe, because many European countries de-
rived their civil codes from the Justinian Code of Rome.60 Before
the Norman Conquest in 1066, England was a loose confedera-
tion of societies and the laws were largely tribal and local; how-
ever, under the Anglo-Norman rule a system of centralized
courts operating under a single set of laws replaced the earlier
tribal rules. 61 This legal system was the common law of Eng-
land, beginning with common customs and, over time, involving
the courts in lawmaking that was responsive to changes in soci-
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 140-41.
59. Id. at 132.
60. Walter Probert, Law, Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia 2004, at
http://encarta.msn.con/encyclopedia 761576108/Law.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2004).
61. Id.
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ety.62 The break up of the feudal groups in the European coun-
tries brought us to the state of society in which we live.63 This
phase in the development of civilization gave rise to the modem
state-one of many names for the more extensive community
held together by a common country and the foundations for a
system of jurisprudence. Without the demise of feudalism, the
theory of sovereignty and the activity of a participatory legisla-
ture might never have been devised.64
The "phenomena of primitive land ownership [suggests
our] earliest cultivating groups were formed of kinsmen," and
property law of today grew from the eventual "dissolution of
these assemblages." 65 These changes were not abrupt and cer-
tain periods of history are distinguished by the predominance of
these patterns of land ownership.66 With the expansion of these
groups, no longer held together exclusively by kinship, society
was giving way to the bonds of land ownership. However, the
feudal conception of social relations still had powerful influence.
The English common law was saturated with these principles,
which shaped evolving customs.6 7 This "mixture of refined Ro-
man law is known to us deceptively by name of feudalism,"
which had been revived after many of its features had "died out
in the Roman world." 68 The modern law of nations embodies
these distinctly legal conceptions in force from the sixteenth cen-
tury onwards, when Roman law was generally received
throughout the western regions of Europe. This became a kind
of universal law.69
The conception of the family, as linked together by Patrias
Potestas, comes to us from the ancient tribal institutions.70
"[A]ccording to ideas which appear to have been once common
to the primitive Romans, to the Irish and Welsh Celts, and to the
original observers ... of the English custom," members who
62. Id.
63. LECTURES, supra note 55, at 86. "It is not, however, difficult to see that without the
ruin of the smaller social groups, and the decay of the authority which,... they possessed
over the men composing them, we should never have had several great conceptions which
lie at the base of our stock of thought ... [such as] the conception of land as an exchange-
ablee commodity, differing only from others in the limitation of the supply .... "
64. Id.
65. Id. at 87-88.
66. Id. at 88.
67. Id. at 86-88.
68. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 130.
69. Id. app. at 410.
70. LECTURES, supra note 55, at 223-24.
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were most emphatically part of the family when it was dissolved
by the death of its head were preferred within the inheritance
scheme.71 The basic principle is that "the right of each member
of a family accrues at his birth and, as the family has in theory a
perpetual existence, there is no particular reason why, if the
property is divided at all, it should be exclusively divided at a
death."72
THE CULMINATION OF KINSHIP RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN TESTACY
"[Iln the primitive jurisprudence everything turned on the con-
tinuity of succession."73 In this scheme, the family patriarch had
extensive rights and "it [was] impossible to doubt that he lay
under an equal amplitude of obligations": if he governed the
family, it was for its collective benefit.74 "[H]e was lord of its col-
lective possessions, and held them as trustee for his children and
kindred."7 The family was a corporate entity and the family pa-
triarch, being at the helm, was its representative. 76
The history of jurisprudence shows a gradual process of so-
cietal dissolution where by "gradations [of] the relation of man
substituted itself for the relation of the individual to his family
and of families to each other."77
Even when this revolution had been accomplished and the
civil tribunal had assumed the place of the domestic forum, "the
whole scheme of rights and duties administered by the judicial
authorities remained shaped and influenced by these 'obsolete'
privileges."7 The devolution of the Universitas Juris,7 1 the older
form of society, remained a part of testamentary and intestate
succession law. This resulting prolongation of a man's legal ex-
istence in his heir, or group of co-heirs, is a reflection of the fam-
ily transferred by a fiction to the individual. Succession in cor-
porations is necessarily universal, and as such, the family was
viewed as a corporation and "corporations never die."80
71. Id. at 224.
72. Id. at 196.
73. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 176.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 179-80.
78. Id. at 180.
79. Id. at 172-73. A universal succession is defined as a succession to a universitasjuris,
or university of rights and duties.
80. Id. at 180.
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The jurists of the seventeenth century commonly asserted
that the power of testation itself was derived of natural law."1
Their teaching held that the right of dictating or controlling the
posthumous disposal of property is a necessary or natural con-
sequence of the proprietary rights themselves.82 This view
"treated succession ex testamento as the mode of devolution,
which the property of deceased persons ought to primarily fol-
low," and "succession ab intestato was the incidental provision of
the lawgiver for the discharge of a function ... left unperformed
through neglect or [untimely] death of the proprietor." 3 These
opinions are expanded forms of the "doctrine that testamentary
disposition was an institution of the law of nature."4 It is uni-
versal, to the extent "that nations are prompted to sanction it by
an original instinct and impulse."a
The effect of the family classification system, whether de-
rived from Canon Law8 6 or simply from a method of shorthand,
helps kin grasp their greater number of kindred in association
with themselves. The advantage gained was in the clarity of dis-
cerning the various degrees of consanguinity, because each of
these classes usually stood under some sort of conjoint responsi-
bility to the other.87 Coterminous with the consanguine social
ordering was the invention of the will.88 The Romans are cred-
ited with inventing this instrument that, next to the contract, has
exercised the greatest influence in transforming human society.89
Initially the will was used as a way to transfer representation of
a household rather than as a method for distributing goods:
It was at first not a mode of distributing a dead man's
goods, but one among several ways of transferring the
representation of the household to a new chief. The
goods descend no doubt to the heir, but that is only be-
cause the government of the family carries with it in its
devolution the power of disposing of the filial common
stock.90
81. Id. at 170.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 170-71.
84. Id. at 171.
85. Id. at 170-71.
86. The official dictates of the Roman Catholic Church; coexistent with the Roman Law.
87. LECTURES, supra note 55, at 214.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 188.
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The will or testament is properly understood as a series of
conceptions. "In itself a will is simply the instrument by which
the intention of the testator is declared."" The testament pre-
scribes the manner of devolution of an inheritance that is a form
of universal succession or university (or bundle) of rights and
duties, which, having belonged at one time to a particular per-
son, can be described as his "legal clothing."92 These are "[t]he
ties which connect a number of [property related] rights" such as
"rights of way, rights to legacies," and obligations -forming a
bundle of legal privileges and duties that attach "to some indi-
vidual capable of exercising them."93 The university of rights
and duties operated among kin as a self-perpetuating reciprocal
arrangement, arising informally among the kinship group and
having the force of law upon death.94
These earliest systems of law left a plain and broad mark in
the resonating authority of the ancestor over the person and
property of his descendants, "authority which may [be] conven-
iently call[ed] by its Roman name of Patria Potestas." 95 "The
person or class of persons who succeeded did not simply repre-
sent the deceased, . . .but continued his legal existence."9 6
The ancient Irish law reveals a society similarly settled upon
and influenced by land rights, but preserving an exceptional
number of ideas and rules belonging to the time when kinship,
not land, was the basis of social union:
This 'natural communism,' ... [did] not arise from any
theory or ... assumption as to the best or [most just]
mode of dividing the land of a community, but from
the simple impossibility, according to primitive no-
tions, of making a distinction between a number of
kinsmen solely connected by their real or assumed de-
scent from a common ancestor. 97
As the common ancestry fades away, the community considers
itself less of an assemblage of blood relations and more of a body
91. Id.
92. Id. at 172-73.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 130.
96. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 183.
97. Id at 188.
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of co-villagers.9 8 The Irish variation on succession was eventu-
ally subsumed with the English tribal succession scheme, known
as Gavelkind, where "[t]he descendants of the latest holder take
his property, to the exclusion of everybody else."99 What rights
that remain of the "portion of the community outside the family
dwindle to a veto on sales, or to a right of controlling the modes
of cultivation." t oo
The Irish are credited with an extension of the kinship
scheme to include the Law of Fosterage, which established in
great detail "the rights and duties attaching to all parties when
the children of another family were received for nurture and
education."10 This practice was denounced by many of the Eng-
lish, who thought that this endowment of consanguine rights
and close affections flouted the significance of the bonds of
common paternity. "Fosterage was an institution, which though
artificial in its commencements, was natural in its operations"
with the bonds between a foster-parent and a child becoming
"indistinguishable from the relations of [consanguine] father
and son."102 Fosterage "created the same Patrias Potestas as ac-
tual paternity;" thus, the foster-father has a claim in life to "por-
tions of the property of the literary foster-son." 03
There is no difference in principal effect, between the mode
of succession of the Scottish Highlander clans circa 1730 and
"the way in which a Hindoo Joint Family was affected by the
death of one of its members."'0 "All the property was held in
common, and all earnings [were contributed] to this 'common
chest or purse,' and the lapse of any one life would have the ef-
fect ... of distributing the dead man's share among all the kin-
dred united in the family group."0 "Each household included
in the Joint Family gains a firmer hold on its share of the lands as
the distance increases from the common ancestor" until it is un-
conditionally appropriated and is "transmitted exclusively to
98. LECTURES, supra note 55, at 188. In this construct, each household clings with in-
creasing tenacity to the allotment that it controls and re-divisions of the land among the
whole community became increasingly rare until ceasing altogether.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 189.
101. Id. at 241.
102. Id. at 242 ("[w]ith such races a very sacred tie was necessarily of the nature of a
family tie, and carried with it the same associations and the same order of feeling").
103. Id. at 242-43.
104. Id. at 187.
105. Id.
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offshoots from its own branch."106  In these kin groups, "each
family [that] separated from the rest tend[ed] to expand [into] a
joint family or sept."'07 Under the more advanced system of
property distribution that grew out of the archaic joint family
form careful attention was paid to lineal descent from the ances-
tor and the separate rights reserved to direct descendants at his
death. At this point, property in its modem form has been es-
tablished; but the joint family has not yet ceased to influence
successions.
When the line of direct descent fails, the rules of the joint
family determine inheritance.08 "This consanguinity is either
lineal, or collateral." 0 9 Lineal consanguinity is defined as the
blood tie that connects persons, where one is descended in a di-
rect line from the other. This would include direct descent from
a father to his grandfather, his great-grandfather, "and so up-
wards in the direct ascending line.. . or from [father] to son,
grandson, great-grandson, and so downwards in the direct de-
scending line. Every generation, in this lineal direct consanguin-
ity, constitutes a different degree, reckoning either upwards or
downwards ... "110
The archaic phrases used to denote these consanguine ties
have one salient peculiarity; they indicate that what actually
passed from the testator to his heir was the family, in the form of
this aggregate of rights and duties. The original testament was,
therefore, an instrument by which the devolution of the family
was regulated-the "mode of declaring who was to have the
chieftainship, in succession to the testator.""' With this objective
in mind then, it is not unusual that the transfer be solemnized by
the sacra, or family rites. "These included the ceremonies by
which the brotherhood of the family [was] commemorated, the
106. Id. at 192.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 195-96.
109. SIR WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, Of the Nature of Laws in General, in 7
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 377 (George Chase ed., 4w1 ed. Baker 1929).
Collateral kindred descend from the same common ancestor (or root stock) but differ from
the lineal descend in that these kinsmen do not descend one from the other. But see Inheri-
tance Act, 1975, c. 63, § 1 (1)(a)-(e) (Eng.). England's 1975 amended legislation covers the
decedent's surviving spouse, former spouse who has not remarried, children, persons treated
by the decedent as children during any of the decedent's marriages, and any person main-
tained in whole or in part by the decedent immediately prior to the decedent's death.
110. BLACKSTONE supra, note 109, at 377.
111. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 185.
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pledge and the witness of its perpetuity." 112 These ceremonies
were an attestation of "sacredness of the family relation."'
With the Romans, the conception of a universal succession
seemed to be a natural process of devolution of rights and obli-
gations, where a testator lived on in his heir or group of co-
heirs.114 These testamentary dispositions were considered defec-
tive and subject to rejection if this legal fiction"15 was even con-
structively violated, and the inheritance would pass to "the kin-
dred in blood" who was capable of fulfilling the conditions
conferred by heirship.116 This interchange was regarded as a re-
ciprocal arrangement stemming from "the primeval period in
which property is owned, not by the family, but through their
family."117
A testamentary diversion of family property outside of the
ancestral line or distribution in uneven proportions stems from
the later portion of the Middle Ages in which feudalism was
completely consolidated." 8 To properly secure the ancestral
claim, in the event that the heir is an infant and unable to defend
his right of heirship, the eldest of the kin was appointed as fidu-
ciary of the kinship estate to secure the proper continuation of
filial succession."9
When modem jurisprudence first showed itself in the
rough, wills were rarely allowed to dispose, with absolute free-
dom, of a dead man's assets, and over the greater part of
Europe, moveable or personal property was the subject of testa-
mentary disposition.120 Only when families ceased to hold to-
gether through a series of generations did the domain get di-
vided equally among the members of each successive
generation; a privilege was no longer reserved to the eldest
son.121 The movement from the family unit to the Agnatic group
of kinsmen, followed by dissolution of this group into separate
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 184.
115. See id
116. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 182.
117. BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 4.
118. LECTURES, supra note 55, at 201, 203-04.
119. Id. As observed under the reign of Henry the Second "[w]hen anyone dies leaving a
younger son and a grandson (i.e., the child of his eldest son), great doubt exists as to which
of the two the law prefers in the succession to the other, whether the son or the grandson.
[There are those who are inclined] to think that the grandson ought to be preferred .... "
120. ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51, at 217.
121. Id. at 221.
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households, culminated in the modern version of testacy where
the household was supplanted by the individual.122
REDISCOVERY OF A CONSANGUINE RIGHT
"The common law of England, as it existed at the time of the
Revolution, was adopted in many of the States by Constitutional
provisions or legislative enactment."123 This ancient body of
law124 encompassed the principles, usage, and rules of action
applicable to the government and security of person and prop-
erty, which did not rest for its "authority upon any express and
positive declaration of the will of the legislature."125 A canvass
of ancient attitudes, the common law, English statutory law, and
American law yield vestiges of a distinct consanguine right. The
ancient constitution of the family has ceased to affect all things,
except for inheritance.126 All laws of inheritance are, in fact,
made up of the debris of the various forms that the family has
assumed since the beginning of civilization.12 7  "Our laws are
mixed as [is] our language; and as our language is so much the
richer, the laws are the more complete."128
The system of kinship succession under common lawl29 and
the whole French law of inheritance, are "derived from Roman
law, which in its latest condition is a mixture of rules having
their origin in successive ascertainable stages of the Roman Fam-
122. Id. at 261.
123. BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 33 n.1.
124. Id. at 30-31. The British as well as the Gallic druids and the Saxons committed all
their laws to memory (due to profound ignorance of the "letter" i.e., illiteracy en masse) and
these oral laws were passed from the former ages to the next solely by word of mouth until
such time as these legal customs came to be recorded in the "several courts of justice, in
books of reports and judicial decisions and in the treatises of learned sages of the profession,
preserved and handed down to us from the times of the highest antiquity." Because their
original institution and authority were not set down in writing, they received their binding
power and their force of laws, "by long and immemorial usage, and by their universal recep-
tion throughout the kingdom."
125. Id. at 33 n.1.
126. Id. at 30-31.
127. Id. Through the ages, the informal exchange and intermixture of customs of the
Romans, Picts, Saxons, Danes, and Normans gradually improved "the texture and wisdom
of the whole" (i.e., English common law) by the accumulated wisdom of these countries.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 376 ("In the English common law, the doctrine of descents or law of inheri-
tances is a point of the highest importance, because all of the rules relating to purchases,
whereby the legal descent is altered or broken, refer to this universally known and settled
law.").
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ily, and is a sort of compromise between them."130 Kinship is a
universal phenomenon that connotes certain basic human at-
tachments made by all people. Anthropologists and social histo-
rians have approached the study of inheritance from succession
patterns and property transfers across social forms,131 and these
findings reflect that the kinship networks chronicled by Henry
Maine and William Blackstone are still at the core of the inheri-
tance process1 32 codified in statutory standards found in the
states and nations abroad.133
"Primary groups are important for adults as well as chil-
dren.134 We have a personal status in primary groups. Primary
groups, in other words, are crucial to our well-being as function-
ing humans." 35 There is general agreement that social scientists
can no longer ignore the legal and social issues surrounding in-
heritance patterns of contemporary family forms due in part to
the increasing number of older people and the potential effects
of statutory standards of inheritance on interpersonal dynamics
and decision-making of contemporary families.'36 In countries,
like the United States, that share a common origin for their legal
statutes on inheritance based on English common law, the post-
industrial age prompted changes in the laws affecting the selec-
tion of heirs in response to changes in marriage patterns and
130. LECTURES, supra note 55, at 219-20. See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at
376. An heir is he upon who is cast the estate (the inheritance) immediately upon the death
of the ancestor. "Descent, or hereditary succession, is the title whereby a man on the death
of his ancestor acquires his estate by right or representation, as his heir-in-law."
131. See John H. Hartung, On Natural Selection and the Inheritance of Wealth, 17
CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 607, 608 (1976).
132. Martin S. Smith & Bradley J. Kish et al., Inheritance of Wealth as Human Kin In-
vestment, 8 ETHNOLOGY & SOCIOBIOLOGY 171 (1987) (analyzing 1000 probated wills
showed that beneficiaries are favored according to their relatedness and reproductive value).
In essence, the writers found that "humans, like other highly social animals, may have
evolved dispositions toward aiding kin in order to maximize the number of copies of an in-
dividual's genes in a population." Id.).
133. See Kris Bulcroft & Phyllis Johnson, A Cross-National Study ofthe Laws ofSucces-
sion and Inheritance: Implications for Family Dynamics 2 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 1, 1 (2000).
The legal standards of succession and inheritance are reviewed in two countries through the
examination of statutory regulations in British Columbia and Washington State and the im-
plications for family dynamics that may result from the statutory standards on inheritance
and succession. "The authors speculate that in both Canada and the United States the cur-
rent statutes on estate bequests foster conflict in families as a result of testamentary deci-
sion-making within the context of the present laws."
134. ROBERT H. LAUER, SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 434 (6"1 ed.
Brown 1995).
135. Id.
136. See Bulcroft & Johnson, supra note 133.
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family forms. 3 7
The Rule Against Perpetuities, enacted by the many state
legislatures 38 as an attempt to eliminate ancient clogs on prop-
erty title,139 would come to intercede in the process of devolu-
tion. But one case that eluded application exemplifies the extent
to which the court will go in recognition of the filial ties that
bind heirs to one another. In Brown v Independent Baptist Church
of Woburn, Sarah Converse died in 1849 and left a parcel of land
to the Church of Woburn, for so long as it shall "continue a
church" with its present religious beliefs.140 In the event of
change in belief or dissolution, the land was devised in equal
portions to ten named legatees, along with the residue of the es-
tate to the same.141 Sarah's husband retained a life estate in both
the residue and the real estate.142 In 1939, when the church
ceased to be a religious organization, the estate reverted back to
the testator. 43
A receiver sold the land for $34,000 under a court order.144
Sarah's ten residuary legatees and twenty-five heirs, as of 1849,
had been dead for decades and so began the arduous process of
searching for the missing heirs, which was guided by a profes-
sional genealogist. 45 By this time there had been three or four
devolution's of the fractional shares in Sarah's possibility of re-
verter, with split-ups into subfractions and sub-subfractions,
but, ultimately, the remote descendants of the residuary devi-
sees were located and given their share of the estate of Sarah
Converse. 4 6 While there is much criticism for the dogged ef-
137. See generally REMI CLIGNET, DEATH, DEEDS AND DESCENDANTS: INHERITANCE IN
MODERN AMERICA (Gruyter 1992).
138. See generally William Hubbard, Communicating Entitlements: Property and the
Internet, 22 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 401, 426 n. 161 (Spring 2004) (discussing the determina-
tion of the costs involved in communicating property entitlements).
139. See, e.g., Walton v. City of Red Bluff, 3 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991);
Ludington & Northern Railway v. The Epworth Assembly, 468 N.W.2d 884 (Mich. Ct. App.
1991). But cf Board of Education v. Miles, 207 N.E.2d 181 (N.Y. 1965) (striking down
retroactive application as unconstitutional).
140. Brown v. Independent Baptist Church of Woburn, 91 N.E.2d 922, 923 (Mass.
1950).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. See also W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in Perspective: Ending the Rule's Reign
of Terror, 65 HARV. L. REV. 721, 741-45 (1952).
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forts 47 on the part of the court to "repatriate" these monies to
the kindred of Sarah Converse, it signifies the perpetual force of
the system of kinship succession operating well into the twenty-
first century.
Despite the changes in family form over the last 100 years,
the predicted demise in family inheritance postulated by re-
nowned social scientist, Emile Durkheim, has not been borne
out.148 According to the majority of studies that have interpreted
bequest patterns among probate records, 149 primary beneficiar-
ies of inheritance remain to be kin and other affective ties.150
Prior to the Industrial Age in America, inheritance norms func-
tioned in farm transfers that were tied to the fulfillment of filial
commitments to older parents.'5  Under the English scheme, lin-
eal ancestors shall inherit in preference to collateral kindred.
The American law of descent closely corresponds with the Eng-
lish rule; however, the inheritance passes to collateral kindred in
the event that lineal descendants or ancestors, who are entitled
to inherit the property first, are unable to do so. 152 The "classes
147. I.e., economic inefficiency to literally "spend" a major portion of the estate in order
to pass nominal sums to the distant collateral clansmen of this woman.
148. T.P. Schwartz, Durkheim's Prediction About the Declining Importance of the Fam-
ily and Inheritance: Evidence From the Wills of Providence, 1775-1985, 37 Soc. Q. 503,
503 (1996). Emile Durkheim predicted nearly fifty years ago that because family was
declining in significance as an economic agency in the larger society, individuals would in-
creasingly make bequests that favored formal agents, such as voluntary organizations over
kin.
149. See generally Frances H. Foster, The Family Paradigm ofInheritance Law, 80 N.C.
L. REV. 199, 225-28 (2001). The movement to reform the inheritance scheme cites the un-
der-inclusiveness of the intestate definition of "natural objects of the decedent's bounty,"
which results in preferential treatment for some kin and legal indifference to the need of
other kinship survivors (e.g., destitute parent, elderly grandparent, disabled sibling, or infant
grandchild left without financial provision). See, e.g., In re Estate of Biewald, 468 N.E.2d
1321, 1324 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (awarding the intestate estate to the decedent's cousins in
first and second degrees rather than her cohabitant of more than fifty years); Vasquez v.
Hawthorne, 994 P.2d 240, 243 (Wash. Ct. App. 2000), vacated en banc, 33 P.3d 735 (2001)
(rejecting the claim of decedent's same-sex partner of thirty years to a share of the intestate
estate); Gonzalez v. Satrustegui, 870 P.2d 1188, 1195 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing the
passing of the decedent's estate to his sister despite the presence of a mail order will giving
his estate to his cohabitant and business partner for fourteen years).
150. Frederick R. Schneider, A Kentucky Study of Will Provisions: Implications for Intes-
tate Succession Law, 13 N. KY. L. REV. 409 (1987); see generally Debra S. Judge & Sarah
B. Hardy, Allocation of Accumulated Resources Among Close Kin: Inheritance in Sacra-
mento, California, 1890-1984, 13 Ethnology & Sociobiology 495, 495-522 (1992) (analyz-
ing legacies of 1538 testate decedents showed that spouses and children received, on aver-
age, ninety-two percent of the estate in Sacramento, California from 1890-1984).
151. See Bulcroft & Johnson, supra note 133, at 4.
152. See Foster, supra note 149, at 199, 228. "The definition may be under-inclusive
because it excludes many currently existing family groups . . . [it] may be over-inclusive
because legal ties do not necessarily create familial ties." But see BLACKSTONE, supra note
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of relatives who shall inherit in such a case are specially desig-
nated by the statutes of the .. . states."'
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AMONG KIN
Implicit in these property transfers is the idea of a social contract
between kin and next of kin, for care and companionship, in re-
turn for the trickle-down effect of accumulated wealth upon
death"4 Today, however, the norms of inheritance have moved
toward more individualistic and affective motivations.155 Recast-
ing these processes of social exchange and filial responsibility
along voluntary lines, combined with the longevity of our aging
population, has raised legitimate concerns for policy makers. 56
As the basic social group unites through bonds of kinship or
marriage, the family' 7 provides its members with protection,
companionship, security, and socialization.'- "[T]he family be-
comes a problem when it does not fulfill its purposes,"'59 such as
assuming responsibility for the care of its elder members. Based
on the social exchange perspective, it is important for inheri-
tance to act as an agent for encouraging solidarity and reciproc-
ity within the institution of the family.160 The emphasis in this
perspective suggests the importance of intergenerational trans-
109, at 391. The true feudal reason for which rule was this; that what was given to a man,
for his personal service and personal merit, ought not to descend to any but the heirs of his
person (earned by him and for the benefit of his kin).
153. BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 390-95 n.7. See generally Foster, supra note 149,
at 199-202. Professor Foster argues that inheritance, with its rigid adherence and presump-
tion in favor of strict kinship succession, has failed to keep pace with the realities of modern
American society. Locked in this family paradigm:
[T]he inheritance system [is] frozen in time, remnants of a bygone era
of nuclear families bound together by lifelong affection and sup-
port .... [I]nheritance law continues to define people by family cate-
gories[,] [with] [d]ecedents and their survivors remain[ing] first and
foremost spouses, parents, children, and siblings [including], rather
than individuals with particular human needs and circumstances that
increasingly defy conventional family norms.
154. If parents do not survive, wealth changes hands from the grandparents to the next of
kin-the grandchildren.
155. Bulcroft & Johnson, supra note 133, at 6.
156. Id.
157. I.e., defined as the nuclear, single, and extended units that include the grandparents.
158. Ida Harper Simpson, Family Sociology, Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia
2004, at http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia-761558266/Family.html (last visited Oct. 28,
2004).
159. LAUER, supra note 134, at 434.
160. Bulcroft & Johnson, supra note 133, at 9 (quoting MARRIN B. SUSSMAN & JUDITH
N. CATES ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE (Sage 1970)).
MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR
fers across the family life course. According to Durkheim, the
inheritance functions as a system of economic transfers in soci-
ety. 161
The "American filial responsibility statutes stem from the
English Elizabethan 'Poor Laws,' which were enacted in 1601."162
These laws dictated that blood relatives were the primary source
of support for family members, including the elderly, with resort
to public assistance in cases only where the private family re-
sources were deficient. 163 The American colonies had similar
laws, such as that in Pennsylvania which imposed tax and sup-
port obligations on "the father and grandfather and the mother
and grandmother and the children"'6 of the infirm family mem-
ber. The existence of such laws 66 is further evidence that the no-
tion of reciprocal filial rights and duties is not a new concept, but
rather it springs from our early Anglo roots. For hundreds of
years, custom provided for the informal execution of these rights
and duties in families. Later, some of these functions were codi-
fied in the testate succession laws.166
In the ancient organized political society, "the great bulk of
men derive their rules of life from the customs of their village or
city"; in the movement from the informal tradition of custom to
the sovereign of today that actively legislates on principles of its
own, local custom and idea have faded.167 As the informal laws
have given way to the formalized political system, their charac-
161. Id. Those individual behaviors in the context of the family hold to the tenet that we
tend to enter into relationships in which we can maximize the benefits and minimize the
costs.
162. See Robin M. Jacobson, Note, Americana Healthcare Center v. Randall: The Ren-
aissance ofFilial Responsibility, 40 S.D. L. Rev. 518, 527-28 (1995).
163. Seymour Moskowitz, Filial Responsibility Statutes: Legal and Policy Considera-
tions, 9 J.L. & POL'Y 709, 711 (2001) (citing 43 Eliz. 1, ch. 1-4, 12, IV (Eng.) (1601)).
164. Colonial Laws of Pennsylvania 1705-6, ch. CLIV, § II, at 251-53.
165. Shannon Frank Edelstone, Filial Responsibility: Can the Legal Duty to Support Our
Parents Be Effectively Enforced? 36 FAMILY L. Q. 502, n.8 (Fall, 2002). Thirty states cur-
rently have filial responsibility statutes. These statutes have also withstood constitutional
challenge. See e.g., Americana Healthcare v. Randall, 513 N.W.2d 566, 573 (S.D. 1994)
(citing Swoap v. Super. Ct. of Sacramento County, 516 P.2d 840, 851, (Cal. 1973) (holding
that this imposition of support was reasonable and appropriately imposed on direct lineal
descendants who themselves were the recipients of care in their minority)). But cf Dept. of
Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 388 P.2d 720 (Cal. 1964) (holding that the care of the men-
tally-ill elder came within the class of persons supported with public funds, and it was not
appropriate to shift this debt to the children).
166. This particular formalization was necessary to safeguard the proper alienation of
land and other property to the next of kin.
167. BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 2 n. 1 (quoting SIR HENRY MAINE, THE EARLY
HISTORY OF INSTITUTIONS, Lect. xiii).
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ter has been distinctly altered.168 Customary law is not "obeyed"
in the same way as enacted law, but to a far greater extent-
custom is followed by instinct. 69 Blackstone agrees, stating that
rules are not supported the same when they come from the legis-
lature:
The actual constraint which is required to secure con-
formity with usage is inconceivably small. When,
however, the rules which have to be obeyed ... ema-
nate from an authority external from the small[er]
natural group and forming no part of it (the legisla-
ture), they wear a character wholly unlike that of a cus-
tomary rule. They lose the assistance of ... opinion,
[and] certainly that of spontaneous impulse.170
Every human society relies to some extent on the coopera-
tion of its members to achieve social purposes that include the
care of its elder members.171 Adam Smith supposed that "man
has almost constant occasion for the help of his brethren," and
that "the propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for
another was 'common to all men."1 72 This reciprocal relation-
ship between kinship members can be likened to an unwritten
bilateral contract 73 comprised of a right-duty relationship de-
rived from the moral obligations on each side' 74 that gives rise to
both a right and a duty on each side. These "[s]ocially endorsed
models of family relationships ... inform both inheritance and
guardianship case decisions.175 Many believe that the younger
168. Id.
169. Id. See generally Foster, supra note 149, at 273 (rejection of the family paradigm
will not mean the demise of the family; this institution will remain, but American inheri-
tance law must become cognizant that the "ties of human affection" do not run solely along
family lines).
170. BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at 2 n. 1 (quoting MAINE, THE EARLY HISTORY OF
INSTITUTIONS, Lect. xiii.).
171. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 11 (1811 ed., bk. 1, ch. II).
172. E. Allan Farnsworth, The Past ofPromise: A Historical Introduction to Contract, 69
COLUM. L. REv. 576, 576 (1969).
173. See generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFIELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
CONCEPTIONS (1923). Professor Hohfield made a lasting contribution to legal literature
through the development of his Hohfeldian terminology. The right and duty are correla-
tive-there can never be a right without a duty, nor a duty without a right. See also Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts § 1 (Reporter's Note).
174. I.e., promises owed of care and companionship that culminates in compensation in
the form of the filial property succession scheme.
175. Alison Barnes, The Liberty and Property ofElders: Guardianship and Will Contests
as the Same Claim, 11 ELDER L.J. 1, 33 (2003).
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generation gains a right to an elderly person's assets, a belief [re-
inforced by] past decades when families toiled together on farms
or in family... businesses." 76
Few societies have been able to develop far without recog-
nizing at least some promises as enforceable,'" and the law of
wills addresses such controversies about family promises. 78
Guardianship law clearly contemplates a preference for family,
with many state guardianship statutes expressing a clear prefer-
ence for the appointment of a family member to act in this pro-
tective, caregiving role.179 Some kin learned that there was
added security if this informal, obligatory exchange among them
was formalized in an explicit contractual promise for care and
filial companionship during life, in exchange for a provisional
inheritance. In a formalized version of this reciprocal filial
relationship, in Tuckwiller v. Tuckwiller,180 the Tuckwillers rented
and farmed the Hudson family farm owned by John Tuck-
willer's aunt, Metta Hudson Morrison.181 When Metta became ill
with Parkinson's disease at the age of seventy, she gave up her
residence in New York and moved back to the family farm
where some rooms had been reserved for her.182 Following a
brief hospitalization for symptoms of dizziness and a possible
stroke and cognizant of the progressive dependence of her con-
dition, she formalized a caregiving arrangement with her
nephew and his wife.113 John Tuckwiller agreed to take care of
his aunt for the remainder of her lifetime:
[B]y that I mean [to] provide her 3 meals per day-a
good bed-do any possible act of nursing and provide
her every pleasure possible. In exchange she will will
me her farm at her death keeping all money made from
it during her life. She will maintain [the] expense of
her medicine.184
That same day, Metta suffered another fainting spell and
sustained a fall that resulted in her hospitalization, rapid decline
176. Id.
177. Farnsworth, supra note 172, at 578-82.
178. Barnes, supra note 175, at 33 n.207.
179. Id. at 24.
180. Tuckwiller v. Tuckwiller, 413 S.W.2d 274, 274-76 (Miss. 1967).
181. Id. at 275.
182. Id. at 276.
183. Id. at 275.
184. Id. at 276
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in health and death within three years.185 This agreement was
challenged following her death. 186 The court upheld specific per-
formance of this caregiving agreement:
Aware of her future outlook and having no immediate
family to care for her, Mrs. Morrison was understanda-
bly appreciative of the personal care and attention of
plaintiff and concerned with the possibility of routine
impersonal care over a long period of time in a nursing
home or similar institution. Having no immediate fam-
ily which might be the object of her bounty, she un-
doubtedly felt more free to agree to dispose of the farm
without insisting upon an exact quid pro quo.18 7
Regardless of the absence of a direct consanguine line be-
tween Metta and her nephew, the strength of the kinship institu-
tion was operational, provisions were in place for the reciprocal
exchange between these relatives, and the court gave it due rec-
ognition. These are the orders of nature, culture, and law that
coalesce to create the American ideas of kinship.188 The primary
elements combine the order of nature and the order of culture,
which together form the "informal" kinship structure that may
or may not be codified by law.8
185. Id.
186. Id. Because of her sudden accident and ensuing decline in health, she was not able
to change her pre-existing will, which provided for the sale of the family farm and proceeds
to be used for a student loan fund at Davidson College. See Barnes, supra note 175, at 29
n.167. ("[E]lders become a threat to conventional social order when they choose to spend
their assets in ways that do not benefit their heirs. . . ."). Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of
Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REv. 235, 244 (1996). It is said that "an influence is
not undue if it merely involves persuasion, please calculated to arouse the testator's sympa-
thy, or the courting of favor, even with the intent to obtain benefits under a will."
187. See Tuckwiller, 413 S.W.2d at 279. But cf Craddock v. Berryman, 645 P.2d 399,
402 (Mont. 1982) (stating that "[c]ontracts to make wills are looked upon with disfavor");
Bentzen v. Demmons, 842 P.2d 1015, 1020 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "[w]hile
equity will recognize oral contracts to devise, such contracts are not favored"). Ray D.
Madoff, Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REv. 571, 576-77, 629 (1997). Madoff
contends that courts use the undue influence doctrine to deny donative freedom to testators
who fail to provide for biological family members.
188. Rosen, supra note 2, at 529.
189. Id. at 529-30. These relationships as they exist in nature and culture may or may not
have any legally defined rights and obligations. "Thus for Americans, much of what is
called kinship is symbolized as a cultural recognition of biological or natural facts. Many of
these relationships, (e.g., mother and father) also exist in the order of law, in that law-
making bodies have created a special symbolic code for governing these relationships."
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THE EXCLUSIVE STATE DOMAIN OF FAMILY LAW
The nature and function of law have varied throughout history
and serve to order society and assure stability in both public and
private realms. Private law encompasses the body of family law,
which defines the rights and duties of kin. "These laws may fall
under the gloss of family law, domestic relations law, estate law,
[and] the law of wills." 90 Because private law involves the vari-
ous relationships that people have with one another and the
rules that determine their legal rights and duties among one an-
other, historically, government involvement has been minimal.191
Under the structure of federalism, certain areas of the law (do-
mestic, criminal, and education law) fall under the exclusive
purview of state control; within this domain, the federal gov-
ernment and the judiciary must tread carefully and must only
get involved when a compelling federal or constitutional ques-
tion concerns the nation.19 2 The lineage of the prominent due
process cases raised questions pertaining to an extension of the
fundamental rights then recognized by the constitution.9 3 The
in-roads made by these due process cases have increasingly
"constitutionalized" the area of family law.
The enduring tradition of family autonomy in American
law holds parental authority as pre-eminent over the minor
children with little unwarranted state intervention. However,
the Supreme Court has upheld a state's role, acting as parens
patraie, to regulate the family upon a showing of harm or threat
to a child.194 Within this autonomous family construct, the
190. Id. at 535 n.1.
191. Probert, supra note 60.
192. D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 76 (2d
ed., Aspen 2002). Traditionally, the "whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and
wife, parent and child, belong[ed] to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United
States." In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890). State control of family law issues was
so exclusive that even diversity of citizenship did not give federal courts authority to hear
domestic relations cases-a principle known as the "domestic-relations exception" to federal
diversity jurisdiction.
193. See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding that a right of
privacy exists for using birth control), Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S,
833 (1992) (declaring that state regulations placing a "substantial obstacle" in the way of
choosing an abortion of a nonviable fetus are unconstitutional); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (declaring that the state's anti-abortion statutes violated plaintiffs personal liberty
right). These cases generally illustrate how fundamental rights have been expanded through
case law.
194. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (declaring that stopping
a minor from selling magazines on the street under supervision of a guardian is not
unconstitutional). In this role, the state will determine what is in the best interests of the
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grandparents are considered legal strangers to the same degree
as third party strangers. The legislatures in every state have re-
sponded to the ensuing disputes between parents and grand-
parents seeking access to their grandchildren by enacting stat-
utes that provide for some form of child visitation rights for
these grandparents.195  The courts have also increasingly re-
garded the resolution of these seemingly private matters or dis-
putes as vehicles for response to changing social conditions and
values. 196 In June of 2000, when faced with the question of
whether a grandparent's right to a relationship with his grand-
child could prevail over the objections of the autonomous family
unit, the Court was thrust into a highly charged constitutional,
private matter. In Troxel,197 the grandparents were seeking ex-
panded access to their two granddaughters following the death
of their son, over the objection of the girls' mother. 98 The Court
sided with Washington high court in striking down a state law
that allowed anyone-even a nonrelative-to seek the right to
visit if it served the best interest of the child.199 In ruling for the
mother, the Supreme Court maintained that the state's visitation
law was over-broad, but stressed that this decision was not in-
tended to affect visitation laws in other states. 200
Yet, the Troxel decision appears contradictory to the Court's
previous stance in Moore v. East Cleveland, another case involving
the issue of extended family relationships.20 1 This plurality opin-
ion struck down a zoning ordinance prohibiting the shared resi-
dency of extended family members in a "single family" dwell-
ing.202
The Court invalidated the ordinance on substantive due
child pursuant to the requisite statutory criteria. See generally Bailey v. Menzie, 542 N.E.2d
1015 (Ct. App. Ind. 1989) (allowing continuing contacts between an adopted child and his
or her biological grandparents in limited circumstances if it is in the child's best interest).
195. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
196. Probert, supra note 60.
197. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. The plurality held that a statute, which gives no special weight to a parent's pref-
erences, was unconstitutional as applied to a mother who had not cut off all contact with the
grandparents. The Court refused to hold that visitation statutes were per se unconstitutional
or to require the rigorous strict scrutiny standard be applied to them.
201. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96 (1977). See also Hodorowski v.
Ray, 844 F.2d 1210, 1216 (5th Cir. 1988). The Fifth Circuit recently observed that the "most
essential and basic aspect of familial privacy-[is] the right of the family to remain together
without the coercive interference of the awesome power of the state."
202. See Moore, 431 U.S. at 495.
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process grounds, applying a "stricter" scrutiny than deferential
rationality review, because "before a zoning ordinance can be
declared unconstitutional it must be shown to ... [have] no sub-
stantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare." 203 The most troubling aspect of the city's argument
was its assertion that the right to live together as a family should
be limited to the situation of "the nuclear family" composed of
parents and their offspring.204 Justice Powell held that the prin-
ciples enunciated in Meyer and Pierce addressed "extended fam-
ily" relationships.205 Quoting from Justice Harlan's concurrence
in Griswold v Connecticut and his dissent in Poe v. Ulman, he cau-
tions the Court to tread carefully in the realm of family rights.
This does not mean abandonment, "nor does it require what the
city urges here: cutting off any protection of family rights at the
first convenient, if arbitrary boundary, the boundary of the nu-
clear family." 206 "Appropriate limits on substantive due process
come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather from careful
'respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the
basic values that underlie society." 207 As Justice Powell wrote in
the leading opinion:
Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects
the sanctity of the family precisely because the institu-
tion of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation's his-
tory and tradition. It is through the family that we in-
culcate and pass down many of our most cherished
values, moral and cultural. Ours is by no means a tra-
dition limited to respect for the bonds uniting the
members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a
household along with parents and children has roots
equally venerable and equally deserving of constitu-
tional recognition .... [Even] if conditions of modem
society have brought about a decline in extended fam-
ily households, they have not erased the accumulated
wisdom of civilization [that] supports a larger concep-
tion of the family.208
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 499.
207. Id. at 495.
208. Id. at 503-05.
Whether or not such a household is established because of personal tragedy,
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Justice Powell's heavy reliance in Moore on Justice Harlan's
tradition-oriented approach to due process within the family
context is comparable to the explanation offered by the Court to
justify and counter challenges to religious symbolism and con-
vocations by secular government entities, which seems to collide
with the prohibitions under the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. This lineage of cases challenging religious symbol-
ism on currency, engraved plaques on government property and
religious utterances by government officials at public ceremo-
nies has been successfully defended on the basis of tradition-
our shared common heritage.209
The Court's retreat from reliance on kinship tradition in
Troxel has left little guidance for state courts in its wake; despite
the Court's admonition that the holding had limited applicabil-
ity to the over-breadth nature of Washington's statute, this deci-
sion has had a "chilling effect" on grandparent visitation rights
in state courts that have followed suit and held their own visita-
tion laws to be unconstitutional. 210 Still other states, including
Maine, have reacted to the Court's ruling by narrowing their ex-
isting grandparent visitation laws21 1 by imposing requirements
such as the grandparent having served as the grandchild's pri-
mary caregiver in the past, or in Maine, the grandparent must
demonstrate for the court the existence of a close relationship
the choice of relatives in this degree of kinship to live together may not
lightly be denied by the State. [The] Constitution prevents East Cleveland
from standardizing its children-and its adults-by forcing all to live in cer-
tain narrowly defined family patterns. Id. at 505-06.
The court distinguished its prior decision in Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S.
1 (1974) (upholding an ordinance that restricted unrelated individuals
from residing within a family-oriented zone).
209. See generally Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding that a Nativity dis-
play on city property does not violate the establishment clause by conferring a religious ad-
vantage on religion, nor does the inclusion of "In God We Trust" on currency and other
permissible religious references); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding a
government prayer observance).
210. Christopher J. Gearon, Visitng the Grandkids Gets Harder, at
http://www.aarp.org/bulletin/yourlife/Articles/a2003-06-26-visitingthekids.html (last visited
October 28, 2004). Since the ruling, Arkansas, Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, and
South Dakota have declared their visitation laws unconstitutional, joining Florida, Georgia,
Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Washington.
211. Id. Even in states that have upheld the constitutionality of their laws, there has been
a narrowing of the law (Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New
Hampshire, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming).
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with the grandchildren in order to get visitation rights.212 These
new limits reverse a thirty-year trend in which grandparents
had seen an effort by state courts across the nation to confer le-
gal standing to them in their pursuit of visitation rights within
the courts.213
"[Liegislation is not the only 'source of law.' Even in coun-
tries of written (statutory) law, other sources also exist"; 214 this is
the paradigm of the unstated in law, "we accept certain conse-
quences that flow from enacted rules as themselves validly es-
tablished." 215 To count these as rules of law, but not as belong-
ing to the stated in law, we must presuppose a notion of validity
different from systemic validity of the codified law. It is well
known that custom lacks obligatory force in systems of written
law, and that is one of the characteristic contrasts between the
former and common law systems. For customary rules, which
are sanctioned by usage in the practical application of law, they
seem to have the force of law. "So the notion of legal validity
has to be modified to deal with precedents and customs func-
tioning as law actually in force. But if we accept this construc-
tion, we see that the field of the unstated is based on presup-
posed notions of validity." 216 These being the strong and
pervasive influence of the kinship ties-this is clearly a custom
embedded in both common law and statutory law.
Perhaps the Court will find a way to skirt this collision
course of rights by applying the best interests of the child as the
exclusive balancing factor in this equation (to associate with his
grandparents). In this way, the inquiry would no longer pit the
constitutionally grounded family autonomy rights of parents
against the legislatively created rights of the grandparents.
Changing the focus removes the court from the precarious posi-
tion of asserting whose rights trump whose within the private
ordering of family relationships. Or the Court could seize on
212. 19-A M.R.S.A. § 1803(l)(B). See generally Berg v. Bragdon, 695 A.2d 1212 (Me.
1997) (child's visitation with grandparent would not significantly interfere with parent-child
relationship or mother's rightful authority over her child and would be in child's best inter-
est); Rideout, (The Grandparent Visitation Act (Act) was narrowly tailored to serve compel-
ling state interest and could be applied in this case without violating the constitutional rights
of parents, who were competent, and the Act did not violate the Due Process Clause; the
best interest of the child standard must be bolstered by a significant previous grandparent-
grandchild relationship to warrant state interference in parent's decision-making).
213. Gearon, supra note 210.
214. Wroblewski, supra note 5, at 93.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 95-96.
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common law tradition to reinforce these kinship ties and side-
step the constitutional question altogether. In keeping with the
wisdom of the Supreme Court in avoiding constitutional ques-
tions when the issue at hand may be decided upon other
grounds, locating a right within the state common law provides
sufficient legal basis. 217
RECIPROCAL RIGHTS DERIVE FROM BOTH MEMBERS OF THIS
DYAD
Profound questions of political and moral philosophy surround
the parents' rights-child's rights dilemma and the issues of the
proper relationship of children to their family and the family to
the state. The pendulum now seems to be swinging more in the
direction of the rights of children.218 This raises profound legal
and ethical questions-questions that have not been fully an-
swered by the courts. The Supreme Court has heard few cases
related to these questions, which have yet to be framed properly
as federal questions probing the depths of our fundamental
paradigm of individual rights. Statutes and regulations may
provide some answers, 219 but a larger question still looms before
us-when will children realize their inherent rights and no
longer be treated as objects of these proceedings, 220 but as par-
ticipants by and through legal counsel.2 21 Children have a right
to grow up in their own families and to remain connected to
217. In re Estate of Longeway, 549 N.E.2d 292, 297 (Ill. 1989).
218. James L. Jenkins et al., Child Protective Services: A Guide For Workers, 196 (U.S.
Government 1979) (guiding Child Protective Services workers on the abuse and neglect re-
sponse process. It consists of identifying and reporting abuse, investigating, and interview-
ing child and family members, and finally assessing and implementing a service plan). In the
context of foster care, this change emerges as a new directive to give children stable family
relationships whether they are with their natural families, adoptive families, or permanent
foster families.
219. ANDREA SALTZMAN & KATHLEEN PROCH, LAW IN SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 183
(Nelson-Hall 1997).
220. Lewis Pitts, The Bar's Ethical Responsibility to Children, 5 A.B.A. J. SEC. OF
CHILD. RTs. LITIG. COMMITTEE 1, 1-3 (Spring 2003) (quoting Susan Cockfield).
221. Leigh Goodman, Providing Legal Services To Prevent the Unnecessary Involvement
of the Child Protection System, 5 A.B.A. J. SEC. OF CHILD. RTS LITIG. COMMITTEE 1, 1-6
(Winter 2003). Cf In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) ("[N]either the 14' Amendment nor
the Bill of Rights is for adults alone." "Under our Constitution the condition of being a
[child] does not justify a kangaroo court." Id. at 29.). In the context of child protection pro-
ceedings, this debate is beginning to take shape. Children's rights advocates maintain that
fewer at-risk children and families will be set adrift in the unknown territory of the child
welfare system if the legal equation is expanded to include the full legal standing of the third
party at interest in each of these cases-the child.
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their extended kinship group. Benefits of kinship care include
continuity in past family relationships and in the child's heri-
tage.222 This inquiry should not turn on the de facto status of
children as property in our legal system, but as persons with
constitutional rights. They are routinely denied the due process
right to counsel and legal standing when they have significant
interests at stake. 3.
In Kingsley v. Kingsley,224 Judge Thomas S. Kirk permitted
twelve-year-old Gregory Kingsley to bring a termination of pa-
rental rights proceeding in his own right. Although the appel-
late court went on record denouncing the court's legal recogni-
tion of an unemancipated minor's right to bring his own legal
action through counsel, 225 the decision of the lower court with-
stood reversal.226 The appellate court held this to be an error
rendered harmless by the separate filings by other parties on his
behalf,2 7 but recognized that the "minor is [the] real party in in-
222. See generally Megan M. O'Laughlin, Note, A Theory of Relativity: Kinship Foster
Care May Be the Key to Stopping the Pendulum of Terminations vs. Reunification, 51
VAND. L. REv. 1427, 1451 (1998). Children can avoid the stigma of foster care while at the
same time maintaining their sense of filial belonging. "[T]he child remains a part of the
family he ... has known and continues the relationships that define him ... : sister, brother,
grandchild, cousin, nephew, niece." (emphasis added).
223. Pitts, supra note 220. There is a huge gap between our rhetoric proclaiming children
as "our national treasure" and the reality of how we accord them "less than full personhood
status" in the eyes of the law.
224. 623 So. 2d 780 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
225. Id. at 784. Cf In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.1989) (citing the parental consent
statute, section 390.001(4)(a) and the related Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.612 specifi-
cally authorize a pregnant, unmarried minor to petition the circuit court for relief without
resort to a legal conduit). See also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 n.7 (1982) (rec-
ognizing "liberty interests of the child").
226. Id. at 782 The court affirmed the "trial court's orders terminating [the biological
mother's] parental rights and [denied] the motion for summary judgment; however, [the
court] reverse[d] the trial court's order granting the adoption petition."
227. Id. at 785. Cf Miller v. Miller, 677 A.2d 64, 66 (Me. 1996), the Maine Superior
Court (Penobscot County, Mead. J.) granted the motion of three minor children to intervene
as parties in the divorce action between their parents and be represented by legal counsel
independently of the guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed previously to represent their inter-
ests. The matter was appealed to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court that reasoned: Al-
though, at common law, minor children have a right to sue and be sued, children do not pos-
sess the requisite legal capacity to participate in litigation in their own names. 43 C.J.S.
Infants § 215 (1978). This incapacity is premised on age, inexperience, and immaturity.
The court ultimately rejected the children's argument that they had a constitutional right to
separate representation, relying on their significant liberty interest in the outcome of their
parents' divorce because of the custodial issues involved. The court agreed that the children
have a definitive legal interest with respect to the custodial (and financial) outcome, but it
remained satisfied that the GAL could adequately secure these due process interests in the
proceeding.
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terest." 228 The court qualified this diminishment in legal rights
stating that "[o]bjective criteria, such as age limits, restricting ex-
ercise of legal rights, although inevitably arbitrary, are not un-
constitutional unless they unduly burden minor's pursuit of [a]
fundamental right." 9 Certainly, one could argue, in the case of
filial rights to visitation with one's grandparents, a significant
interest is at stake and one that may soon ascend to the stature of
a fundamental right.
Due to their incapacity, children must bring or defend a le-
gal proceeding through an adult representative, such as a next
friend230 or a guardian ad litem (GAL).231 However, a significant
distinction can be drawn between the more limited role of a
GAL or next friend and that of an independent legal advocate
acting on behalf of the children's legal interests. It is clear: a
GAL will try to discern what is in the child's best interests, re-
gardless of whether this perspective actually aligns with the
child's expressed wishes, as opposed to the attorney's profes-
sional mandate to act zealously in advocating for the client's ex-
pressed interests (i.e., the former leads, while the latter follows
the lead of the client).232
228. See Kingsley, 623 So. 2d at 784. If a minor brings his/her own action, this is a de-
fect, which can be cured by appointing a next friend or a GAL. The child is still the real
party in interest, but courts require that a reasonable adult person conduct the litigation on
behalf of the minor.
229. Id. at 782 ("[T]he trial court ruled that Gregory, as a natural person who had knowl-
edge of the facts alleged, had standing to initiate the action for termination of parental rights,
... [T]he trial court implicitly accorded [him] capacity to file the petition .... ).
230. The term "next friend" is of English origin. In re Beghtel's Estate, 20 N.W.2d 421,
423 (Iowa 1945). According to Blackstone, a next friend is any adult person who volunteers
to undertake a minor child's legal cause (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES at
464 (Sharswood ed.)). A next friend represents a minor child in the absence of a regularly
appointed guardian. Garcia v. Middle Rio Grande Conservancy Dist., 664 P.2d 1000, 1006
(N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 663 P.2d 1197 (1983), overruled on other grounds;
Montoya v. AKAL Security, Inc., 838 P.2d 971 (N.M. 1992). There is no formal appoint-
ment required for a next friend. Dye v. Freemont County School Dist. No. 24, 820 P.2d
982, 985 (Wyo. 1991). However, a next friend is not a party to the suit that she prosecutes
on behalfofa minor child but is an officer of the court and, as such, is under the control of
the court and can be removed if the best interest of the child so requires. In re Beghtel's
Estate, 20 N.W.2d at 423-24 (emphasis added).
231. A guardian ad litem (GAL) is a representative appointed by a court to represent a
child in a specific legal matter, such as in abuse and neglect proceedings, see, e.g., 22
M.R.S.A. § 4005; and in estate proceedings, 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-403(4). As an officer of the
court, the rights and duties of the GAL are essentially the same as that of the next friend.
Missouri ex rel. Dept. of Soc. Serv., Div. of Child Support Enforcement v. Kobusch, 908
S.W.2d 383, 385 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
232. The model rules provide guidance to the attorney who is engaged to represent the
legal interests of a client whose "capacity to make adequately considered decisions in con-
nection with a representation is diminished, whether because of minority . . . or for some
74 MARQUETTE ELDER'S ADVISOR [Vol. 6
Although the Supreme Court has occasionally held that
freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is protected
by the Due Process Clause, 233 Still the Court has refrained from
stating whether children have a liberty interest in maintaining a
relationship with a parent.2 "[W]e have never had occasion to
decide whether a child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with
that of her parent in maintaining her filial relationship."235
Maine's court, likewise, retreated from a ruling on this related
issue. "We also have no occasion in this case to decide whether
minor children have a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in the outcome of the divorce of their parents." 236
But the Supreme Court has identified exceptions to the pa-
rental child-rearing prerogatives. The state can intervene and
override religious beliefs that dictate the withholding of lifesav-
ing medical care to a minor child.237 Acting under the doctrine
of parens patriae, officials can petition the court on behalf of the
child in need of the exigent medical care. Most courts have
compelled the treatment over the religious wishes of the parents,
on the theory that the state's interest in protecting the minor's
welfare outweighs those rights of religious liberty (including
subrogation of their family autonomy and child-rearing
rights).238
other reason," and advise that "the lawyer shall, as far as reasonably possible, maintain a
normal client-lawyer relationship with the client." Comment (1) elaborates on this further,
stating that the "normal client-lawyer relationship is based on the assumption that the client,
when properly assisted, is capable of making decisions about important matters" and offers
an example of "children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of ten or
twelve, who are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal proceedings
concerning their custody." Comment (4) advises that whether a lawyer should look to the
parents as natural guardians may depend on the nature of the proceedings and explicitly
warns that in cases where a guardian for the ward is acting adversely to his interests, "the
lawyer may have an obligation to prevent or rectify the guardian's misconduct. See Model
Rule 1.2(d).
233. See Miller, 677 A.2d at 68 n.6.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. (quoting Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989)).
237. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 344-45
(5th ed., West 2001). "The Supreme Court has always held that children are not permitted
to become martyrs to their parents' (or their own) religious beliefs." Id. at 273. Where the
treatment is not highly invasive, courts have universally ordered the treatment of the child
(e.g., blood transfusion for a Jehovah's witnesses child). See, e.g., In re D.R., 20 P.3d 166
(Okla. Civ. App. 2001) (ruling that parents' refusal to permit medical treatment based on
religious beliefs are subject to criminal prosecution in death of child).
238. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 74-75. However, these "rights" are not absolute and must
cede to the separate and distinct interests of the child. See infra note 318.
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While in Wisconsin v. Yoder,23 9 the Court invalidated Wis-
consin's refusal to exempt the students of the Old Order Amish
from the state's mandatory school attendance policy until the
age of sixteen. The Amish argued that school attendance be-
yond this age burdened the practice of their religion by interfer-
ing with the spiritual inculcation of farming and nonsecular pur-
suits. The Court ultimately reasoned that the state's interest in
having a well-educated citizenry was not seriously compro-
mised by this sect, which functions independently of the main-
stream community. The majority conceded that the Amish chil-
dren who failed to attend high school would not receive the
same level of intellectual learning, but the informal vocational
training provided by their sect would prepare them well for life
in the Amish community. Justice Douglas was the sole dissenter
in Yoder and argued that the majority was wrong to decide the
case without determining whether each of the children involved
desired to attend high school over the objections of his parent;
he contended that the child's desires should be pre-eminent. 240
Judicial recognition of the emerging autonomy of a mature
minor has been codified in the judicial bypass laws permitting a
pregnant minor to petition the court directly to exercise her right
to an abortion.241 This mechanism, in particular, illustrates the
239. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
240. Id. at 241-49. The words of his solitary dissenting opinion fell on deaf ears, as often
happens when an idea is too novel and threatening to the entrenched legal paradigm of the
day. Justice Douglas was a man ahead of his time, suggesting that children may have inter-
ests, even rights, that are separate and apart from those of their parents and that the Court
should recognize this compelling third-party interest. See, e.g., Albert J. Krieger, Chair's
Report to Members: Gideon-40 Years Later 18 A.B.A. J. SEC. OF CRIM. JUST. 1 (Spring
2003). The Supreme Court may address this question again and create a new rule regulating
our relationship with our government. Facially, that rule will appear to be based upon prece-
dents that may be relevant by rationale or community experience. "The evolving nature of
our law is a constant challenge-we are not content to mire our relationships with our soci-
ety in a matrix that is unyielding and unfeeling of the emotional senses and spirit that marks
our interchanges." Krieger is a criminal defense attorney in Miami, Florida and chair of the
Criminal Justice Section.
241. In states requiring parental consent to a minor's abortion, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that a procedural mechanism for judicial bypass must be in place; whereby, a
minor can appear in court and have the opportunity to persuade a judge that she is suffi-
ciently mature enough (or emancipated) to make this decision herself. Upon such a show-
ing, the court must override the parental veto. See generally Planned Parenthood of Cent.
Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that the spouse or parents of a woman do
not have absolute right to bar an abortion); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (holding
that a pregnant minor is entitled to show that she is mature enough to make an abortion deci-
sion or that such a decision would be in her best interests); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417 (1990) (ruling that the state may require consent for a minor deemed insufficiently ma-
ture, but judicial bypass procedure must be available).
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court's recognition that the interests of a minor and her parents
may actually diverge on a matter having serious religious impli-
cations and demonstrates the court's willingness to permit the
minor to supersede the traditional parental authority. These
cases illustrate why a legal inquiry should not turn on the de
facto status of children as property in our legal system, but as
persons with constitutional rights.242
That the Supreme Court would be inclined to sidestep this
"loaded issue" for now is not surprising in light of the principle
of judicial restraint on offering advisory decisions, 243 the federal-
ism concerns and the domestic relations exception in the federal
judicial forum.244 The inevitable storm of controversy, sure to
follow such a ruling can frequently act as a deterrent for the
Court to carefully sidestep the legal fray.245 But the extension of
these rights to children at the center of certain family law pro-
ceedings need not herald the anarchy of minors from their par-
ent's rightful authority. 246 Legal recognition of children's rights
need not herald a "parade of horribles." 247 It is not necessary to
242. See Pitts, supra note 220. See, e.g., Scott, 834 P.2d 6 (holding that the inviolability
of certain rights is evinced by the fact that parents lack the authority to waive a minor's fu-
ture right to a cause of action for injuries due to third-party negligence). The "inviolability
of a person" has strong historic roots in Anglo-American law that it was not to be curtailed
without clear and unquestionable authority of the law. See also New York v. United States,
505 U.S. 144, 147 (1992) (holding that even states cannot acquiesce a constitutional right,
referring to state sovereignty, despite the existence of a compelling government objective).
243. While some state supreme courts are authorized to issue advisory opinions, the Su-
preme Court is constrained in doing so pursuant to the negative limitations imposed on the
judicial branch under Article III, Section 2, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution. In a series of
rulings that have evolved from case law, the Court has "avoided passing upon a large part of
all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for decision." Ashwander v. Tenn.Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J. concurring). Because of this judicial restraint,
the Court will not issue advisory opinions in advance of the necessity of deciding them, nor
will the Court decide a controversy in broader terms than are required by the precise facts of
the case before it.
244. See generally U.S. const. arts. I-Ill; Bill of Rights. The federal government is one of
limited, enumerated powers among the three branches. Under the Tenth Amendment, the
states retain all powers not delegated to the federal government by the Constitution, nor pro-
hibited by it. See U.S. const. amend. X. Family law, education, and criminal law come
within the traditional domain of the states for purposes of regulation.
245. Id.
246. See infra note 247. A similar warning of the dreaded "slippery slope" is cast in this
article on expansion in organ donation programs. Cf Charles Krauthammer, Yes, Let's Pay
for Organs-Not from the living, which would be degrading but the dead are a diferent
story, TIME, May 17, 1999 at 100 (objections to novel donor programs, such as Pennsyl-
vania's plan to reward organ donation with a payment of $300 to decedent's relatives to off-
set funeral expenses, cite this as the beginning of a full-scale market in human body parts).
247. See Miller, 677 A.2d at 70. The court forecasts a "slippery slope" of children's
rights, warning that it cannot afford to "indulge in a myopic view" in ruling on this specific
case, "for none of the implications noted are fanciful once intervention is permitted." The
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establish a "fence" around the law; with limitations intended
only to keep us away from more serious encroachments into the
area of parental authority, a new line can be drawn and fence
moved inward2 48 Without crossing a fateful line.2 49
Because society and culture are dynamic, our government
must, of necessity, be adaptable and adjust to the changing times
and relationships that life brings us. With changing times, come
differences in how we view each other and how we look upon
our government. 250 While our catalogue of individual rights may
not change, their exercise may vary as our society's survival re-
quires. Even precedent cannot resist a condition of dissonance,
because what is right, even when it seems to conflict with our
body of law, is still more right than wrong.251
court explains that "divorce litigation would be complicated exponentially by the involve-
ment of children as parties," protracting the litigation with the resultant financial burden to
the parties and the court system. The Supreme Court has frequently warned of landmark
cases that foretell passage beyond "a point of no return," where the flood of litigation in re-
sponse to an expanded definition in constitutional rights will create utter pandemonium.
Hindsight has proven otherwise. Cf, e.g., Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) ("[The major-
ity opinion] justifies this unprecedented intrusion into the process of elementary and secon-
dary education by identifying a new constitutional right. . ." (Powell, Burger, Rehnquist, JJ.
and Blackmun, C.J. dissenting). See also Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (nar-
rowing of due process requirement in deference to administrative resources; yet another ex-
ample of the "rights" balancing act).
248. See Miller, 677 A.2d. at 70.
249. Id.
250. See Krieger, supra note 240, at 1. Krieger is quick to remind all practicing attorneys
that it is difficult to conceive of a person unrepresented in a criminal court, and yet, "for
roughly the first 175 years of the republic's existence, the U.S. Supreme Court did not ac-
cept the right to counsel as one of the fundamental rights that the states were compelled to
recognize under the 14th Amendment." For nearly twenty-one years, based on its decision in
Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court remained steadfast in holding that the right to
counsel was not one of the fundamental rights, until the Court's reversal of Betts in Gideon
v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). "What happened to change the Court's mind? Did
someone find precedents that did not exist before?" The doctrine of stare decisis is an imper-
fect methodology, but it is malleable to correction by the Court. (emphasis added). Acting
as devil's advocate, Krieger challenges the legal reader:
After all, we are a nation governed by law and not by the changing moods of a
society in constant metamorphosis. To substitute the subjective "what is right"
test for the specificity of the law is, at the very least, an invitation to disorder-
at worst it's anarchy. [As lawyers] trained to respect precedent as if it were the
words of the deity, spoon-fed the doctrine of stare decisis to the exclusion of
tastier morsels that appeal to rationality and reality. My legal foundations were
rendered unstable when a mentor said, "I am more interested in what is right
than precedent."
251. Id.
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A CHILD'S VESTED INTEREST IN HIS FILIAL HERITAGE
The compelling nature of the familial blood tie is unavoidable
and continues to impact judicial decision-making.2 52 Within the
realm of advanced reproductive technologies, the state courts
have been repeatedly faced with competing parties on family
matters,253 regarded as highly private concerns under the aus-
pices of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.254 One
such battle, decided by California's Supreme Court, involved a
custody dispute between the unrelated gestational mother and
the natural, "genetically-related" mother and the "genetically-
related" father.25 Here, the court found no reason to recognize a
multiple parent arrangement:
[The court] decline[d] to accept the contention of
amicus curiae . .. that [it] should find the child has two
mothers. Even though rising divorce rates have made
multiple parent arrangements common in our society,
[the court] see[s] no compelling reason to recognize
such a situation here. The Calverts are the genetic and
intending parents of their son [and] to recognize paren-
tal rights in a third party would diminish [Mrs. Cal-
vert's] role as the mother.25 6
The court also commented on the legislative intent and con-
cluded that, while the Act may recognize both genetic consan-
guinity and giving birth as means of establishing a mother and
child relationship, when the two means do not coincide in one
woman the law of California will recognize the "natural"
252. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 237, at 135-36.
253. Id. at 136. Cf, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 67 Ohio Misc. 2d 54 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 1994)
(rejecting, in part, the reasoning in Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); Belsito, an
Ohio case involving a dispute over whose name would be listed on the child's birth certifi-
cate, held that parentage would be determined solely by genetic contribution and not the in-
tent of the parties to the surrogate agreement).
254. See, e.g., lineage of family privacy, autonomy cases, supra notes 193-94; Griswold,
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding penumbra of privacy surrounding marital relationship; J.,
Goldberg proposed the Ninth Amendment be viewed as a "catch-all" category of rights not
specifically enumerated in the Bill of Rights but intended by the framers to be "retained by
the people" against encroachment by the federal government).
255. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776. See generally In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988)
(invalidating the surrogate contract and emphasizing the inviolable nature of blood ties when
granting the genetically-related gestational mother liberal, unsupervised visitation with the
child of this arrangement).
256. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 781.
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mother.257 Beyond the court's recognition of the special blood
ties in these cases is the other common thread in the analysis-
that of the "best interests" of the child being the ultimate "tie-
breaker" in these contested cases. 258
In a number of states, courts have addressed this question
of filial rights from the standpoint of the grandparent seeking
visitation rights with their grandchildren. The Supreme Court
of Kentucky in King, for example upheld the constitutionality of
a statute, which a trial court used to ordered visitation by a
child's grandfather over the objection of the child's parents?59
There the court stated, "[tihis statute seeks to balance the fun-
damental rights of the parents, grandparents, and the child,"
and that the legislature has "determined that, in modem day so-
ciety, it was essential that some semblance of family and genera-
tional contact be preserved. If a grandparent is physically, men-
tally and morally fit, then a grandchild will ordinarily benefit
from contact with the grandparent . .. ."260 The pragmatism of
the court in King is also reflected in the New York grandparent
visitation statute, which provides for the petitioning for contact
when "circumstances show that conditions exist which equity
would see fit to intervene." 261
The dissenting opinion in King held that the majority's fatal
flaw was in its conclusion that a grandparent has a "fundamen-
tal right" to visitation with a grandchild. But perhaps the flaw
in this opinion was in not defining this right as a reciprocal
right-a fundamental filial right flowing between grandparent
and grandchild. Both are entitled to lay claim to this relation-
ship right262 derived from primordial society and to salvage this
blood connection, irrespective of parental marital status or cir-
cumstances. Additionally, the child's competing right to main-
257 See FURROW ET AL., supra note 237, at 136 (determining maternity under the Uni-
form Parentage Act of 1973).
258. See generally Johnson, 851 P.2d at 799 (applying the "best interests" standard
serves to assure that in the judicial resolution of disputes affecting a child's well being, pro-
tection of the minor child is the foremost consideration) (Kennard, J., dissenting); In re
Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227 (applying the best interest standard in placing child in custody of
biological father); Doe v. Doe, 710 A.2d 1297 (Conn. 1998) (applying best interest test in
determination of custody between biological father and unrelated mother; the child was born
as a result of artificially inseminated surrogate mother).
259. King, 828 S.W.2d at 631.
260. Id. at 632.
261. N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law § 72 (McKinney Supp. 2004).
262. Due to the legal minority status of the children subject to these proceedings it is in-
cumbent upon the grandparent to assert the claim, but the right originates with both grand-
parent and grandchild.
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tain this consanguine tie is on parity with the parent's assertion
of "family autonomy." In these cases, the Court should act as
the tiebreaker, not in applying the typical "best interests balanc-
ing test," but rather in permitting the visitation unless it can be
demonstrated that such contact would not be in the best inter-
ests of the child. In these instances, the only "significant trigger-
ing event" required for a legal assertion of court ordered visita-
tion is to establish "substantial interference by the parent" with
the grandparent-grandchild relationship.263 However, this statu-
tory formula is similar to that rejected by the Court in Troxel.264
In Troxel, "it bears noting that several justices spoke at
length about the rights of children despite the fact that [the]
children in the case had not asserted any rights independent of
the family autonomy claims of their mother."265 The plurality
opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, carefully avoided articu-
lating a hierarchical scheme of family rights that would have en-
titled parents to strict scrutiny of any state visitation rules that
sought to protect children's relations with extended family at the
expense of parent's autonomy. In a separate opinion, Justice
Kennedy emphasized that the constitutional importance of fa-
milial relationships depended on the emotional attachments that
derived from daily contact, and he indicated that a best interest
standard in deciding cases about visitation was "not inherently
unconstitutional." 266
263. Cf In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995) (illustrating the exact
inversion of the Wisconsin Supreme Court's use of the "significant triggering event" that
would justify a court's intervention in the relationship between a child and a natural or adop-
tive parent; further holding that it was not limited in its equitable powers by the visitation
statute (referring to the marital dissolution "triggering" provisions) but could act to protect
and secure the best interest of a child in circumstances not included in the statute), overruled
by In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W. 2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
264. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 58. The plurality found it problematic that the state trial
court had given no special weight to the mother's determination respecting the best interest
of her children. "In effect, it placed [on a fit parent] the burden of disproving that visitation
was in the best interest of her daughters . . . ," a rebuttable presumption that grandparent
visitation was in the child's best interests.
265. Id. at 64-65. (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). Grandparents should not be relegated
to the status of any third party stranger (emphasis added). Perhaps, the commentary of the
justices acknowledging the rights of children who are the focus of these "contests" foretells
a change in the Court's perspective. Cf., DAVID GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE
RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 541-44 (1998), (documenting that
similar "foreshadowing by the Court," evinced by Justice Brennan's choice of the 'bear or
beget' language in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that dissimilar treat-
ment of married versus unmarried persons with respect to the legality of contraceptive dis-
semination did violate the Equal Protection Clause), resulted from Justice Brennan's antici-
pation of the abortion decision), quoted in WEISBURG & APPLETON, supra note 192.
266. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 57.
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In his dissent, the comments of Justice Stevens revealed that
the door had not been closed on the issue of children's rights,
but rather the debate in this forum was just beginning to take
shape:
While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate
the nature of a child's liberty interest in preserving es-
tablished familial or family-like bonds, it seems to me
extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families
have fundamental interests in preserving such intimate
relationships, so, too, do children have these interests,
and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the
equation.2 67
Justice Stevens also accused the plurality of treating chil-
dren as chattels. This prompted Justice O'Connor's explanation
that the Court did not regard children as parental property and
that discussions of parents' rights were not a rejection of other
rights but a recognition that visitation cases could raise issues of
constitutional importance. 26 8 The plurality's careful use of lan-
guage and the resounding absence of exclusivity in parental
autonomy, taken together, seemed to foreshadow the Court's
recognition of the emerging rights borne by children.
AN IMPLICIT POLICY CONSENSUS IN THE LEGISLATIVE
PREFERENCE FOR KINSHIP TIES
Certainly, the legal posture of a child viewed as a sovereign in-
dividual holds a compelling claim to maintain his kinship ties.
This premise is reflected in the very origins of the filial unit and
has become ingrained in our human consciousness as an inher-
ent right of affinity flowing both to and from the progeny of our
kin. That a consanguine connection is inviolable resonates often
in the administration of the legal rights of inheritance and the
great lengths to which this ancestral continuum is observed and
protected by the court in child protective proceedings initiated
by the state. Under the section relevant to the permanent dives-
267. Id. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting). These are "reciprocal rights" that flow to-and-
from the respective parties and, as such, the legal consideration must not be unilateral but
must encompass the rights that emanate in both directions. These reciprocal rights and du-
ties in the filial context spring from the very beginning of organized communities that were
later formalized in the context of property succession within families. See ANCIENT LAW,
supra note 51.
268. Id. at 64-65 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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titure of the parent-child relationship, the statute emphasizes
that the inheritance rights shall remain. "An order terminating
parental rights divests the parent and child of all legal rights,
powers, privileges, immunities, duties and obligations to each
other as parent and child, except the inheritance rights between
the child and his parent." 26 9 Still further, kinship-based protec-
tion is extended pursuant to section 4056(3) which states, "[n]o
order terminating parental rights may disentitle a child to bene-
fits due him from any 3rd person [grandparents and other filial
kin], agency, state or the United States; nor may it effect the
rights and benefits that a native American derives from his de-
scent from a member of a federally-recognized Indian tribe."2 70
This basic common law right is also mirrored in other foun-
dational elements of Maine's codified child protection statutes.
Maine's Child And Family Services And Child Protection Act 27 1
accords enhanced recognition for kinship placement of a child in
cases of temporary and more permanent removal of children
from the custody of their abusive parents. Pursuant to section
4005-B, the grandparents are recognized as legitimate candidates
to become parties to the child protection action by petitioning
the court for intervenor status.272
Section 4005-E(2) of the grandparent visitation and access
statute states 'that [a] grandparent who is designated as an
interested person or a participant ... who has been granted
intervenor status under the Maine Rules of Civil Procedure,
Rule 24 may request the court to order that the child be
placed with the grandparent. A grandparent who has not
been designated as a participant ... may make the request
for placement in writing. In making a decision on the re-
quest, the court shall give the grandparents priority for con-
sideration for placement if that placement is in the best in-
terests of the child ... .'7 In so doing, the State has expressly
recognized grandparents as the preferred child protective
wards to their grandchildren (as opposed to foster care with
families who are kinship 'strangers' to the child).x
269. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4056(1) (West 2004).
270. § 4056(4).
271. § 4033.
272. § 4005-B.
273. § 4005-E(2).
274. § 4053(3). In addition to this kinship preference, if the child protective matter in-
volves a mature minor, defined as a minor between 12 and 14 years of age, he has the right
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State and federal legislative enactments reflect this defer-
ence for the filial connection. The Minnesota court of appeals
upheld a lower court's ruling,2 75 which granted custody to the
maternal grandparents in a dispute with the foster parents who
also sought to adopt the child. Under the relative preference of
the Minority Adoption Act,276 the court is required, in the ab-
sence of good cause to the contrary, to give preference first to
placement with a relative of the child. The court's consideration
of the child's race, in this placement decision, was challenged by
the child's GAL and the NAACP which argued that the Minne-
sota provision277 gave impermissible weight to the issue of race
in adoption proceedings in violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Equal Protection Clause, the core purpose of which is to
do away with government sanctioned discrimination based on
race.278 The appellate court held that the racial classification
failed under the Equal Protection Clause because it was not nec-
essary to the legislative purpose.279 The court stated:
The heritage of minority children can be protected
without the [race] classification by making the prefer-
ences for relatives applicable to all children.... There is
... both longstanding common law which favors pro-
viding custodial preference to near relatives, and a
strong legislative policy of awarding the permanent
care and custody of a child to a relative ... as opposed
to a strangers.28 0
The legislature, thus, emphasized the importance of preserving
the biological family.2 81
Based on the record, the appellate court affirmed the trial
court's finding that the child would benefit from her placement
with her grandparents and the support afforded by extended
to object to the severance of his filial rights and in the case of a 14 year-old, the court cannot
order the termination. § 4055(3).
275. In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d 408, 410 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
276. MINN. STAT. § 259.28(2) (repealed 1997).
277. § 259.28(2) (requiring the court, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to
follow certain placement preferences in the adoption of a child of "minority racial or minor-
ity ethnic heritage").
278. In re D.L., 479 N.W.2d at 412.
279. Id. at 416.
280. Id. at 413.
281. Id. at 414.
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kinship ties. 282
Congressional recognition of inviolable kinship ties has
been emphatic in regard to Native American children. In Missis-
sippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield,28 the Supreme Court
delivered an opinion on the provisions of the Indian Child Wel-
fare Act of 1978 (ICWA)2 84 that establish exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion over child custody proceedings involving Indian children
domiciled on the tribe's reservation. 285 In the 1974 Congressional
Hearings, older Indian children who had been removed by local
welfare authorities testified "that society was putting on them an
identity which they did not possess and taking from them an
identity that they did possess."286  Further testimony from the
1978 hearings focused on the impact on the tribes of the massive
removal of children, yet "the only real means for the transmis-
sion of the tribal heritage is through the children as they are
raised among their own people."287
This argument is compelling and plausible in the context of
any extended kinship tie whether, that filial kinship group is
Irish, Anglo, Franco, Latino, or African-American. 288 These kin-
ship networks are not distinct from the other inasmuch as they
are structured with the same purpose. These groups are de-
fined, thus, as "a social system of various forms governing the
reciprocal obligations between members of a culture who are
held to be related." 289
Quite simply, a tribe is defined as a "human community
composed of blood-relatives that acts to preserve its own cus-
282. Id. at 416. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari sub nom. in Sharp v.
Hennepin County Bureau of Soc. Serv., 506 U.S. 1000 (1992). The Minnesota legislature
revised the statutes to apply the listed preferences to relatives of all children. MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 259.57 (West 1996). Ultimately, all reference to race was deleted, and an explicit
preference for placement with relatives was enacted in its place.
283. 490 U.S. 30, 33 (1989).
284. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. The Indian Child Welfare Act was the product of rising
concern in the mid-1970s over the consequences to Indian children, their families, and tribes
as a result of their separation in foster homes and adoption due to judicial findings of child
abuse.
285. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 409 U.S. at 30.
286. Id. at 33.
287. Id. at 35. This observation was made by Mr. Calvin Isaac, Tribal Chief of the Mis-
sissippi Band of Choctaw Indians and representative of the National Tribal Chairmen's As-
sociation in his testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs of the
ninety-fifth Congress in 1977.
288. Cf ETHNIcITY & FAMILY THERAPY, Preface xii - xiii (Monica McGoldrick et al.
eds., Guilford Press 2d ed. 1996).
289. THE NEW LEXICON OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 542
(1991 ed.) [hereinafter WEBSTER'S].
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toms and beliefs within the larger social network."290 In the ab-
sence of a statutory definition, the Court will "start with the as-
sumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordi-
nary meaning of the words used." 291 Certainly, then, all kinship
groups could fit these definitions. To hold otherwise would
constitute the simple language of another word-racism. 2 92 The
right to one's heritage should not be limited to the children
within the jurisdiction of a federally recognized tribe.
At the close of the 1974 Senate Hearings, Senator Abourezk
noted the critical importance of the extended family concept in
the care of Indian children and the inculcation of their tribal
identity:293
The congressional findings that were incorporated into
the ICWA reflect these sentiments. Congress found
that there is no resource more vital to the continued ex-
istence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children
.. . [and] that the [s]tates, exercising their recognized
jurisdiction over Indian child custody proceedings
through administrative and judicial bodies, have often
failed to recognize the essential tribal relations of In-
dian people and the cultural and social standards pre-
vailing in Indian communities and families.294
The ICWA Title I safeguards, designed to preserve the recip-
290 Id. at 1053 (emphasis added).
291. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 9 (1962); Russello v. United States, 464 U.S.
16, 21 (1983). See also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1188 (abridged 8th ed., West 2000).
The plain-language movement in the law encourages legal writers and business writers to
write clearly and concisely - without legalese - while preserving accuracy and precision.
The opinions of Antonin Scalia, associate justice of the Supreme Court (1986 - present) are
notable for this plain-language interpretation. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW - AN ESSAY (Princeton University
Press 1997), reviewed by David Franklin, Judge Dread, Jan. 22, 1997, available at
slate.msn.com/id/2960 (last visited Oct. 28, 2004). Cf Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
William Johnson (June 12, 1823) reprinted in GORDON CARRUTH & EUGENE EHRLICH, THE
GIANT BOOK OF AMERICAN QUOTATIONS (Portland House 1988) ("Laws are made for men
of ordinary understanding, and should therefore be construed by the ordinary rules of com-
mon sense. Their meaning is not to be sought for in metaphysical subtleties, which may
make anything mean everything or nothing, at pleasure.").
292. WEBSTER'S, supra note 289, at 823.
293. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 35 ((statement of Sen. Abourezk
construing Indian Child Welfare Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Indian Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs,) 93d Cong., 2d Sess.). See also Wisconsin Po-
towatomies of Hannahville Indian Cmty. v. Houston, 393 F.Supp. 719 (WD Mich. 1973)
(discussing custom of extended family in the care and responsibility of children).
294. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 35-36; 25 U.S.C. § 1901.
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rocal filial rights of the Indian children and their extended tribal
kin, include various procedural and substantive standards for
state child custody proceedings2 95 with a clear emphasis that
adoptive placements be made preferentially with members of
the child's extended family.296 As stated in the House Report,
ICWA "seeks to protect the rights of the Indian child as an In-
dian and the rights of the Indian ... tribe" to maintain these con-
nections. 297 The deference shown to extended filial ties in the
text of ICWA and its legislative history and hearings speak to
the congressional concern for filial rights that are reciprocal in
nature between these tribal members.298 The concern and en-
hanced protection afforded to this group based on their Native
American ethnicity299 mirrors that of a non-Indian child similarly
situated who is denied access to his extended kin or they to him.
"[H]e has absolutely no idea who his relatives are, and ... effec-
tively make him a non-person and ... destroy him." 00
Internationally, the idea that children possess rights is uni-
versally accepted by every nation in the world community, but
the United States has refused to sign on to the United Nations
Rights of the Child (CRC) convention,301 though it has signed
295. These procedural safeguards include requirements concerning notice and appoint-
ment of counsel; parental and trial intervention and petition for invalidation of proceedings
for lack of jurisdiction; procedures governing voluntary consent in termination of parental
rights; and full faith and credit obligation to tribal court decisions. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-
1914.
296. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 37; see In re Appeal in Pima
County Juvenile Action No. S-903, 635 P.2d 187, 189 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that it
is in child's best interest that his relationship with tribal members be protected). See also
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 4062 (1999) (giving preference to an adult relative over a
nonrelated caregiver in placement of child within child protective custody).
297. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 37.
298. Id. at 56 (explaining § 1915 of ICWA as conferring upon tribes certain rights, not to
restrict the rights of parents of Indian children, but to complement and effectuate the recip-
rocal rights of the child and tribal kin).
299. Id. at 52. (ICWA recognizes that the tribe [comprised of extended kin] "has an in-
terest in the child which is distinct from but on a parity with the interest of the parents."
(emphasis added) (quoting In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 970 (Utah 1986)).
State actors must use caution in the denial of a parallel interest in other "non-Indian" ethnic
cultures for the obvious facial challenge brought on equal protection grounds. There are a
multiplicity of "white" ethnic groups in the United States having a distinct cultural heritage;
these groups should not be transformed into one amalgamate, homogenous and indistinct
class of "white" people not warranting deference by the Court.
300. Id. at 50 (quoting Louis La Rose, chairman of the Winnebago Tribe, in S. REP. ON
THE ICWA at 43).
301. Davik-Galbraith, supra, note 1, at 158 n.71. See United Nations Convention on the
Rights of the Child [hereinafter CRC], G.AA. Res. 44/25, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 49,
U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (Nov. 20, 1989); see art. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1448. Ironically, although the
United States was a key player in the drafting of the UN's convention on children's rights
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various Hague treaties that deal with inter-country adoption is-
sues, child labor, and custody. According to the CRC scheme,
children are viewed as interdependent members of a family with
an emerging individuality that parents and government entities
must respect. They are entitled to support and care by their par-
ents, the right not to be separated from their parents except
where it is in their best interests, and the right to a family iden-
tity.302
In contrast to the international movement in recognition of
children's rights, the American scheme of family law doctrine
appears reticent to elevate a child's interests or needs to the legal
stature of a right. Perhaps this is out of fear that this would po-
sition the child on equal legal footing to challenge a parent or
other entity in court. But a periodic re-examination of these
rights and responsibilities insures that our legal schemes remain
viable within the larger context of evolving societal conceptions
of basic justice.303 Rigid adherence to a hierarchy of family rights,
with the parents' power reigning supreme,04 will continue to ob-
fuscate what should be the central concern-the rights emanat-
ing from the child with respect to the legal battles that rage
around him. The rights of the parents need not "trump" the
rights of the grandparents in a standoff to stay connected to their
grandchildren. The court need only consider the "unnamed
party" in this triad-the grandchild, and unless visitation is not
in his best interests, the inquiry need not go any further than
this. Johnston explains, "[a]s children mature, they become bet-
ter able to make sense of connections that are not just social and
are more interested in the distinctions. Genetic relatives provide
some explanation for how one looks and for the special skills
one possesses for certain physical, intellectual, or artistic en-
deavors."305 The importance of a child's filial connections is
and provided many of the child-centered doctrines that form the basis of this treatise, it did
not ratify the CRC.
302. See id. CRC art. 3 (best interest of the child), art. 8 (preservation of identity), art. 9
(separation from parents), & art. 10 (rights to reunification with parents).
303. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Out of Children's Needs, Children's Rights: The
Child's Voice in Defining the Family, 8 B.Y.U. J. OF PUB. L. 321, 324 (1994).
304. National Interdisciplinary Colloquium on Child Custody Law, LEGAL AND MENTAL
HEALTH PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD CUSTODY LAW: A DESKBOOK FOR JUDGES, 208-09
(Robert J. Levy ed., 1998).
305. Patricia Irwin Johnston, Sibling Attachment 2-3, at
http://www.pactadopt.org/press/articles/sib-attach.html (quoting DR. ANNE BERNSTEIN,
FLIGHT OF THE STORK: WHAT CHILDREN THINK AND WHEN ABOUT SEX AND FAMILY
BUILDING. (Perspectives Press 2000)) (last visited Nov. 4, 2004).
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gaining recognition by the courts, in the context of siblings who
become separated as a result of a state child protective proceed-
ing.o6 At least ten states have programs, laws, or policies that
promote sibling placements and mandatory visitation sched-
ules." California already recognizes a foster child's right to
maintain a consanguine tie among his siblings and, in 1998,
adopted a bill that contains provisions aimed at facilitating post-
adoptive contact between siblings who are not placed together.
Under the new law, recommendations for sibling visitation are
to be included in children's adoption case plans. 08 This inviola-
ble ownership in one's personal history enhances the sense of
family that each of us takes into adulthood. This connection
gives children a core sense of who they are and where they come
from. When we are gone, it is this store of family history and
memories that we will leave our children who share these kin-
ship roots?10 "With that knowledge and sense of belonging,
they can move more confidently into the future."1 o
CONCLUSION
The idea of an exclusive, autonomous family unit is a legal fic-
tion authored by the Supreme Court.31' There are no absolutes
306. Id. See also Diane Riggs, Sibling Ties Are Worth Preserving, ADOPTALK (A Pub-
lication of the N. Am. Council on Adoptable Children) Spring 1999, at 1. Separated siblings
are robbed of future family connections as well; they may never know their nieces and
nephews, and their children will miss out on knowing aunts and uncles.
307. See Riggs supra note 306, at 1-3. In Chicago, a new sibling program run by the Jane
Addams Hull House Association pays foster parents an annual salary of $16,000 plus bene-
fits (in addition to the state's monthly payment per child) when they assume care for a group
of brothers and sisters. New York offers rent-free housing plus extra money and benefits for
taking sibling groups. Kentucky offers financial incentives for foster families who take sib-
ling groups and Florida has a pilot program similar to the Hull House. In 1996, the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) implemented a visitation policy for
children in care. The policy states that the Department will schedule visits "among all sib-
lings in substitute care who are placed apart at least twice per month, beginning no later than
two weeks after the Department is awarded temporary custody of any siblings." Thereafter,
these "[v]isitation goals then become [a mandatory] part of the children's case plans, and are
subject to examination at each child's administrative case review."
308. Id.
309. See Johnston, supra note 305, at 2-3.
310. See Riggs, supra note 306, at 3. In the words of one adoptive mother, "[k]nowing
her birth siblings has helped to make [her daughter] whole." Many children who are
adopted have holes from lost connections with their birth family members. "I can provide
the love and nurturing, but I can't plug the other holes unless I can help my children take
ownership of their histories."
311. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (prohibiting instruction in any lan-
guage other than English is unconstitutional and holding that pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment, parents have the right to raise their children free from state interference);
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in the overlapping and competing penumbra of rights cloistered
within the Constitution-where your rights end where mine be-
gin.3 12 The major historical change in family values from one of
a collective view of family to one of individualization, over the
last several decades, has led to an exaggerated emphasis on
emotional nurture, intimacy, and privacy as the major base of
family relations. "It has contributed considerably to the libera-
tion of individuals, but it has also eroded the resilience of the
family and its ability to withstand crises. Moreover, it has con-
tributed to a greater separation among family members and es-
pecially to the isolation of older people,"313 under the guise of
"parental rights."314 In most cases, it is appropriate that laws
empower parents to act on behalf of their minor children's wel-
fare regarding decisions that require knowledge and maturity
that they may be lacking. But in some cases, immersed in mari-
tal acrimony, empowering the parents has the effect of defeat-
ing, rather than promoting, children's empowerment.315
There are also times when children's rights will reinforce
those of the parent, and sometimes they are in tension with
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (finding a law requiring attendance at public
schools was unconstitutional and violated the Fourteenth Amendment right of parents to
direct the upbringing and education of children under their control). The Court has made
numerous rulings that have interpreted the rights of parents to raise their children free from
state interference.
312. Cf, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that criminal
laws that "incidentally" interfere with a religious practice do not impermissibly burden the
free exercise principles). The Oregon officials did not have to give an exemption. Is this to
be a nation of exceptions where legislation serving legitimate public health, safety, or wel-
fare concerns must be conformed to each citizen who steps forward with a religiously based
complaint? See Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The early free exercise challenge,
waged by devout Mormons intent on practicing bigamy pursuant to their religious edicts,
were held to be legitimately proscribed under the federal territory laws. The Supreme Court
likened the practice to religiously motivated human sacrifice; both were conduct that vio-
lated the social duties and warranted prohibition by the state. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that religious rights are not absolute when they collide with certain state interests
(e.g., the states need not accommodate religious-based exceptions to the criminal code).
313. Tamara K. Hareven, Continuity and Change in American Family Life, in FAMILY IN
TRANSITION 40, 47 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H. Skolnick eds., 8k" ed. 1994).
314. See generally John Dewitt Gregory, Family Privacy and the Custody and Visitation
Rights ofAdult Outsiders, 36 FAM. L. Q. 187 (Spring 2002) (concluding that family auton-
omy and its concomitant parental authority are under an unrelenting attack from the new
child savers). See, e.g., John Dewitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation
by Legal Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351, 361 (1998). Despite the Supreme
Court's long silence with respect to third-party visitation, there has been an abundance of
state court decisions and legislative enactment on the subject.
315. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Talking About Children's Rights in Judicial Custody
and Visitation Decision-Making, 36 FAM. L. Q. 105, 118 (Spring 2002) (referring to cases
involving the "mature" minor's acquisition of judicial override in parental consent required
to obtain an abortion).
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those rights. But when families seek protection from the intru-
sive intervention of the state, talking about children's rights
lends added weight to their claims of family autonomy, privacy,
and the right to maintain family relationships. The occurrence
of domestic discord (or other state intervention) alters this pic-
ture, however, and when a judge must decide the matter giving
due weight to the child's rights will actually clarify-not hin-
der-the search for the just resolution among the parties. 16 As
Justice Stevens stated in Troxel, these cases "do not present a bi-
polar struggle between the parents and the State over who has
final authority to determine what is in a child's best interests.
There is, at a minimum, a third individual whose interests are
implicated in -every -case to which the statute applies -the
child." 17
Troxel may be a landmark decision, but it stopped short on
the status of grandparents' visitation rights. The American As-
sociation of Retired Persons (AARP) supports [both] parents'
rights and the visitation rights of grandparents when it is in the
best interest of the child. There is no doubt grandparents are
important, even crucial, to their grandchildren's well being, and
visitation can only enhance those relationships.318 While very
few family disputes go to court, grandparent visitation rights are
crucial, because most grandparents play an invaluable role in
the lives of grandchildren.3 19 Prior to 1965, that role was not well
recognized, and grandparents who were blocked from seeing
their grandchildren had no legal recourse to assert visitation
rights, but state legislatures soon recognized the need for this le-
gal remedy in light of the high rate of divorce and separation.3 20
According to an article published in AARP Modern Maturity
magazine, "the latest census figures show that 4.5 million chil-
dren under 18 live in grandparent-headed households, placed in
kinship care as opposed to foster care due to issues of neglect or
abuse." 321 In Troxel, the Supreme Court reiterated that "the in-
316. Id. at 132-33.
317. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
318. Gearon, supra note 210, at 28.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Sander M. Reese, You Can't Say No To Blood, 46 AARP MODERN MATURITY 52
(Jan./Feb. 2003) ("The total is up 30 percent since 1990-even though the total under-18
population increased just 14.3 percent in the same period. And contrary to the stereotype of
the poor, inner-city grandmother raising her children's children, the phenomenon now
reaches across all economic and ethnic groups."), available at
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terest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their chil-
dren is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests
recognized by this Court"m1 but noted that the proliferation of
grandparent visitation laws among the states speaks to the
"changing realities of the American family."323
But the laws have failed to keep pace with the changing
composition of the American family; many of "the laws regard-
ing custody, adoption, and parental rights remain as they were
written decades ago." 324 The courts and family law are in a pe-
riod of flux and must resort to "realism" in the context of the
changing view of family relationships. "Legal realism is not so
much a philosophical theory as it is an attitude that calls for an
instrumental utilitarian use of the law that rejects legal fic-
tions."325 Consanguinity, or kindred, is an inviolable connection,
or relation, of persons descended from the same stock or com-
mon ancestor; this tie has historical consequence. The current
legal paradigm cannot turn a blind eye to grandparents in the
broad definition of family and relegate them to the status of
third-party strangers. To do so risks a condition worse than
mere perpetuation of a legal fiction. Legal precedent such as
this, that flouts common sense, will not have the legitimacy nec-
essary to sustain itself in the long term. It is a paper castle built
on legal contradictions, and it will surely fold against the winds
of change.
The current fragmented approach by the states on the issue
of grandparent visitation rights326 was further exacerbated by
Troxel's failure to address the multiplicity of situations in which
access to the grandchild can be denied entirely.327 A more cogent
http://www.aarpsegundajuventud.org/english/issues/2003-octlyour ownblood.htm (last
visited Oct. 28, 2004).
322. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65.
323. Id. at 64.
324. Reese, supra note 321, at 52.
325. See Rosen, supra note 2, at 535. By family law, the author includes the entire body
of law that defines the rights and duties of kin. These laws fall under the gloss of family
law, domestic relations law, estate law, the law of will, etc. See also WEBSTER'S, supra note
289, at 565. That persons related to one another can be characterized in legal discourse as a
third-party stranger is truly a "legal fiction" (an assumption conventionally allowed in law)
and flouts the common understanding attributed to the word as evinced by this source's
definition of a stranger as "a person who is not known to one."
326. The proliferation of disparate grandparent visitation statutes among the states does
not detract from legitimacy of this legislatively recognized filial right and remedy, but rather
it speaks more to the need for the drafting and adoption of a uniform statute to ease the di-
verse lineage of cases across the United States.
327. An intact parental unit denies access to grandchildren, leaving absolutely no re-
course for the grandparent due to the absence of a triggering event that creates the requisite
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legislative response to this issue would be a shift in focus from
the adversarial parties (i.e., grandparent vs. parent) to the heart
of the matter-what would most benefit the children who are
the subject of the proceeding.3 28  Presumably, then, all of the
players should be "on board," because the state, the parents, and
the grandparents would all share the same objective-doing
what is in the "best interests" of the child.
In contrast to the values of individualism that govern much
of family life today, traditional valueS329 of collectivity have per-
sisted among various ethnic groups,330 much like the interde-
pendence of early kinship networks, which first gave to law the
prominent place it has since occupied in the evolution of human
society.331 During the nineteenth century, in working class and
ethnic families the relationships between husbands and wives,
parents and children, and other kin were based upon reciprocal
assistance and support. Such relations, often defined as "in-
standing: a divorce, separation, or parental death. See Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575
(Tenn. 1993) (deciding that the granting of reasonable visitation to a grandchild in the case
of an intact marriage would be overly intrusive of the parent's right to decide this question
pursuant to the state constitution); Cf Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991)
(explaining that the New York grandparent visitation statutes are broadly drafted, allowing
for a "catch-all" equity category that confers standing for petitioners "in circumstances in
which equity would see fit to intervene); Lehrer v. Davis, 571 A.2d 691 (Conn. 1990) (ex-
plaining that the court could not render a decision in the matter due to the issue of "ripeness"
but offered an advisory opinion in dicta; the status of the parents' relationship as intact does
not automatically invalidate a petitioner's standing, to do so would call the fitness of other
parents into question based solely on their relationship status and perhaps the legislature
could find sufficient public interest grounded within a child's filial association with his
grandparents) (emphasis added).
328. King, 828 S.W.2d at 632 (holding that regardless of whether a family was "intact"
the inquiry as to the grant of visitation to grandparents should be child driven. If visitation
is deemed to be in his best interests, the Supreme Court's identification of exclusivity in pa-
rental child-rearing decisions, without undue government interference, will not block visita-
tion deemed to be appropriate in the judgment of the Court) (emphasis added).
329. Grandparenthood is both custom and tradition. It is woven into the very fabric of
the American family and has become the traditions that define us as a nation. On each Sep-
tember 15, our calendars note this as the date to honor and celebrate grandparents nation-
wide. The "tradition" argument has also been invoked by the Court in defense of the contin-
ued use of "God" uttered in proceedings of the state and noted prominently on our currency.
This emphasis on tradition and the permissible usage of this symbolism in the face of appar-
ent conflict with the fundamental religious freedom protected by the First Amendment is not
unlike the collision occurring between parental autonomy and the historic tradition of the
grandparents' relationship with their grandchildren.
330. Telephone Interview with the author, Oct. 24, 2004 (explaining S. E. Thorne's gen-
eral reference to collectivist arrangements among tribes - specifically Irish - compared to
ethnic collectivist arrangements in the U.S. today, as set forth in BRACTON ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 1997 (translated by S. E. Thorne, translator, professor of legal
history, Harvard University).
331. See generally ANCIENT LAW, supra note 51; BLACKSTONE, supra note 109.
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strumental," drew their strength from the assumption that fam-
ily members were all engaged in mutual obligations and in re-
ciprocity. These assumptions grew, not from law, but from so-
cial values:
[These] obligations were not specifically defined by
contract, they rested on the accepted social values as to
what family members owed to each other. In the pe-
riod preceding the welfare state [these] instrumental re-
lationships among family members and more distant
kin provided important supports to individuals and
families, particularly during critical life situations. A
collective view of familial obligations was the very ba-
sis of survival.332
The increase in adult life expectancy means that grandpar-
enthood extends into old age much more often; this means that a
person will get a chance to spend more time being a grandpar-
ent.333 The trend of earlier retirement and more leisure time,
combined with a longer life span, results in more time available
to get to know and enjoy this special intergenerational relation-
ship with their grandchildren. 334 Fostering a sense of intergen-
erational connectedness is no longer just a nice idea but has be-
come a critical piece of the familial support network.335 "[A] new
theme has emerged: 'generational justice.' Many now ask, 'how
much do the young owe the old?"'33 6 The interdependence of
lives within the new kinship structure need not be viewed as a
threat to the young adult generation's family independence or as
a social problem to be managed by the family and community.337
The Supreme Court may be pressed to address this question and
create a new rule regulating our kinship relationships, and only
the future will reveal whether the rule satisfies the subjective
testing of what is right, regardless of the rule's intellectual sub-
332. See Hareven, supra note 313, at 46.
333. CHERLIN & FURSTENBERG, JR., supra note 18, at 106.
334. Id. at 109.
335. See generally LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & ALISON MCCHRYSTAL BARNES, ELDER
LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 19-21 (Lexis 3rd ed. 2003). See also Stephanie Coontz, The
Way We Wish We Were, in FAMILY IN TRANSITION, 71 (Arlene S. Skolnick & Jerome H.
Skolnick eds., HarperCollins 8th ed. 1994). The purpose is not to berate people for aban-
doning past family values, nor to extort them to adopt better values in the future-the prob-
lem is to build the institutions and social support networks that allow people to act on their
best values rather than on their worst ones.
336. Id. at 26.
337. See RILEY, supra note 15, at 499.
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stance.338
Healthy members of the elder generation are willing to earn
their place in the family by creating their own personal ties with
the descendant grandchildren. "Without contact with grand-
parents, a child loses a vital and natural way to see and under-
stand that he is part of a continuum, that he has roots, that he is
the future and the hope of all those who preceded him."3 9 And
perhaps, at the close of their lives, the younger kin, having ex-
perienced this sense of connectedness, will be poised to recipro-
cate with advice and emotional support to their elder kin.3m Af-
ter all, these "[flamily faces are magic mirrors[;] looking at
people who belong to us-we see the past, present and fu-
ture."3'
338. See Krieger, supra note 240, at 27 ("One thing is certain, if the new rule fails to es-
tablish what is right, [the legal profession] is equally bound to struggle for its change. It is
in this process that liberty's definition thrives."). See also BLACKSTONE, supra note 109, at
28. "From this method of interpreting laws, by the reason of them, arise what we call eq-
uity."
339. Davik-Galbraith, supra note 1, at 144 (quoting Grandparents Rights: A Resource
Manual Before the House Select Comm. On Aging, 1 02D Cong. (statement of the Chairman
of the Subcomm. On Human Serv.)).
340. See RILEY, supra note 15, at 500.
341. JANET L. WARD, A QUESTION OF BALANCE 17 (Edna McConnel Clark Foundation
1997) (quoting Gail Lument Buckley, Court Appointed Special Advocate).
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